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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
One of the main challenges today for both national governments and transnational/international governance 
institutions is how to manage international migration, i.e. balancing the interests and needs of transit and host 
countries, countries of destination, and those of the migrants and their families. Safe, orderly and regular 
migration is recognized as beneficial to all parties involved. Nonetheless, a significant share of international 
migration takes place outside regular channels, either through unlawful entry or through regular entry and 
irregular stay and work at destination. For high-income countries, combatting irregular migration and channelling 
prospective migrants into regular flows is a high-priority policy challenge. This report addresses the dearth of 
comparative policy research in the area of regular/irregular migration. Findings could support the development 
of policy options and good practices that States could draw upon to improve their respective migration realities.
The relationship between discouraging irregular migration through enforcement and encouraging regular 
migration flows is not straightforward. Relevant studies have highlighted complex dynamics. While stricter 
controls through both “fencing” (border controls) and “gatekeeping” (visa restrictions) policies appear to slow 
irregular migration, they also tend to change its course, leading migrants to try their luck through alternative 
irregular channels. These could include applying for asylum to gain a temporary legal entry and stay (until the 
application is processed), or using the services of migrant smugglers to cross a border with fake documents or 
simply unlawfully. 
The situation is quite complex; for instance, increased controls may also result in shifting asylum seekers to 
irregular migration. Faced with implementation of a restrictive asylum policy, people seeking protection who 
could qualify for refugee status may instead opt to be smuggled into the desired destination country. Such a 
deflection effect, where flows shift from asylum to irregular migration, occurs when visa and asylum policies 
become more restrictive. On the other hand, the experience of the United States of America in the last six 
decades suggests that strict border enforcement can reduce irregular migration flows only if it is coupled with a 
significant increase in visa channels and regular pathways. While both are necessary conditions for discouraging 
irregular migration and encouraging legal flows, neither is sufficient on its own. 
This report reviews four sets of policies and approaches that can help discourage irregular migration and bolster 
regular pathways. These include:
(a) Enhanced regional mobility regimes that allow for relatively seamless mobility within a set of countries, 
coupled with specific rights and obligations for workers and employers: These are broad regimes that lower 
the transaction costs regarding controls and enforcement, and facilitate the matching of supply and demand. 
They work better when placed within wider economic and political cooperation frameworks, as happens 
in the European Union or in the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR, for “Mercado Comun del Sur”). 
Regional schemes, however, present potential loopholes when the participating States lack the political 
will and administrative capacity to implement them (as in Africa within the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS)) or are characterized by large-scale tolerance of exploitation and even trafficking 
of migrant workers (as, for instance, has been the case in the fisheries in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)). 
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(b) Bilateral mobility schemes between a country of origin and a country of destination that respond to 
specific labour market dynamics: Such bilateral regimes may regulate both seasonal/temporary needs in 
specific labour market sectors such as agriculture or domestic work. They can be highly regulated as 
seasonal agreements with set duration and conditions, or be more flexible forms of circularity where the 
migrant may be based in the country of origin (as happens with Ukrainians in Poland) or in the country of 
destination (as happens with Ukrainians in Italy). The advantages of such schemes are that they can follow 
or reinforce pre-existing economic or sociopolitical relationships between a given destination country and 
specific origin countries. Their disadvantage is that they usually concern temporary or seasonal migration. 
(c) Sponsorship schemes that may facilitate entry and integration of the migrant and her/his family at destination: 
Such sponsorship schemes are manifold, and may concern: 
(i) A labour migrant who has a job offer (as happens in the various selective high-skill migration schemes, 
particularly those of Australia and Canada);
(ii) A migrant seeking employment (hence legalizing what often happens informally through migration 
networks, as was experimentally implemented in the late 1990s in Italy); or
(iii) A refugee seeking resettlement in a third country. 
Sponsorship can be private (by families or individuals) or public (by the State) or indeed semi-public (e.g. 
by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)). Sponsorship schemes offer optimal conditions for selectivity, 
which may be relevant particularly for high-skilled migration, but may be perceived as unfair concerning 
refugees, as they inadvertently privilege those with pre-existing kinship or other networks. The challenge 
for private sponsorship schemes is also that support may be uneven or discontinuous. Optimal sponsorship 
arrangements need to be supported and monitored by State structures.
(d) Humanitarian corridors that aim at preventing vulnerable migrants (including those who have become 
stranded) from undertaking irregular migration, with a view of arriving in a safe third country: Such corridors 
are targeted initiatives by international and civil society organizations in cooperation with destination 
countries, and aim at providing resettlement to people who need it. The question is whether such schemes 
could function on a regular, sustained basis. 
Turning to the potential of regularization mechanisms, this report recognizes the complex realities of international 
migration and the fact that sometimes migrants and their families fall through the cracks of administrative and 
enforcement systems. Seeking to avoid protracted situations of irregularity, regularization mechanisms remain a 
tool for addressing vulnerability in exceptional circumstances.
Overall, this report highlights policy elements that have been observed to deter irregular migration promoting 
a flexible migration regime with the following characteristics: 
(a) A variable geometry approach: Different types of schemes for different types of migrants and for different 
sets of countries – regional and bilateral regimes offer important insights here.
(b) A smart approach: A focus on migration pressures and on populations at risk of turning to irregular 
migration when regular migration or asylum-seeking pathways are not available to them. We need to devise 
focused policy tools that alleviate these pressures before they erupt into a crisis – a smarter understanding 
of contextual factors driving irregular migration.
(c) A balanced approach that responds to labour markets and other considerations of destination countries, 
developed in cooperation with origin countries, and which acknowledges the needs of migrants and their 
families. 
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New ideas put forward include: 
(a) Temporary Migration Partnerships: These are multilateral partnership schemes between a country of origin 
and a country of destination, which also directly involve employer associations, trade unions and other civil 
society stakeholders. They should last for a set number of years and would involve using payroll taxes for 
investment. In destination countries, these taxes should be invested in innovation and technology. In origin 
countries, such taxes should be used to fund education and employment at origin. Either way, the aim will 
be to reduce dependency on migration: remittance dependency at origin, and “disposable” migrant labour 
dependency at destination.
(b) Skills and Mobility Partnerships: These are public–private sector partnerships involving employers and States 
at destination, and technical colleges and State authorities at countries of origin. The existence of both a 
“home” and an “away” track needs to be included for such partnerships to work for both countries. There 
would need to be joint design of the curriculum, and the “away” track would include an apprenticeship 
period at the destination country. Public funding from the country of destination could be provided for 
the “home” track. Employers would need to heavily subsidize the “away” track training, and destination 
countries would make clear visa schemes available as an integral part of the partnership. Students would be 
asked to finance themselves for the apprenticeship period at destination through loans provided by credit 
institutions at destination countries, guaranteed by the employers. 
(c) Human Development Visa Scheme: This would be open to citizens of participating States, would be managed 
through a centralized ballot-based selection of applicants, would have no skill level requirement (open to 
all levels) nor specific migration category requirement (e.g. worker, student, etc.). Migrants winning Human 
Development Visas would be able to take their immediate families with them to the destination countries. 
The scheme would function with an annual quota set by participating destination States, which could be 
revised each year. Those winning the visa would be eligible to work along with their spouses (if applicable). 
They would also be able to access education and other services at destination, while also having sufficient 
security of status that they would be able to maintain connections with the country of origin. The Human 
Development Visa would be of a sufficiently long duration (e.g. five years) to allow the migrant and her/his 
family to integrate at destination and, where applicable, apply for a long-term permit. It would be linked to 
overseas development assistance, including through community-based schemes in origin.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Managing international migration in ways that effectively balance the concerns and interests of all parties 
involved, notably countries of origin, host or transit countries, countries of destination, and migrants themselves 
and their families, is a formidable task. While safe, orderly and regular migration can be a win–win situation, 
international migration often happens outside legal channels and involves irregular entry, stay and work at 
destination. For many countries, channelling prospective migrants into regular flows is a high-priority policy 
issue. However, the relationship between preventing irregular migration and encouraging regular migration flows 
is not straightforward. This report addresses the dearth of comparative policy research in the area of regular/
irregular migration. Findings could support the development of policy options and good practices that States 
could draw upon to improve their respective migration realities.
Relevant studies on the links between regular and irregular migration have highlighted complex dynamics. While 
stricter controls through both “fencing” (border controls) and “gatekeeping” (visa restrictions) policies1 appear to 
slow irregular migration, they also tend to change its course, leading migrants to seek alternative points of entry. 
Thus, when border controls intensify, migrant smuggling networks try alternative (and often more dangerous) 
routes. When visas for temporary or long-term work decrease, prospective labour migrants may come in as 
students or simply cross a border unlawfully. In the absence of visas for construction work, for instance, migrants 
may enter through seasonal permits for agriculture and engage in irregular work in construction. 
Such deflection effects may also occur between migration and asylum entries: people may apply for asylum to 
gain temporary legal entry and stay (until the application is processed) and work for a while, until they may be 
rejected and returned. On the other hand, faced with the implementation of a restrictive asylum/entry, people 
seeking protection who could qualify for refugee status may decide to opt for being smuggled into the desired 
destination country. Czaika and Hobolth argue that such a deflection effect, which shifts flows from regular 
entry for asylum to irregular migration, happens when visa policies become more restrictive.2 Clemens and 
Gough (2018) take stock of the experience of the United States in the last six decades to further suggest that 
strict border enforcement can reduce irregular migration flows only if it is coupled with a significant increase in 
visa channels and regular pathways.3 While both are necessary conditions for discouraging irregular migration 
and encouraging legal flows, neither is sufficient on its own. 
The links between regular and irregular migration pathways are indeed manifold and intertwined. Trying to 
disentangle them goes beyond the scope of this report. What we shall aim to accomplish here is to identify 
some of these dynamics and how they can best be addressed and leveraged by relevant policies. Starting with a 
short reflection and clarification of concepts and terms (regular/irregular migration, forced/voluntary migration, 
labour migration/asylum seeking, and so on), we shall then turn to discuss four sets of policies and approaches 
that can help discourage irregular migration and enhance regular migration. These include:
1 Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini, 2011.
2 Czaika and Hobolth, 2016.
3 Clemens and Gough, 2018.
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(a) Enhanced regional mobility regimes that allow for relatively seamless mobility within a set of countries, 
coupled with specific rights and obligations for workers and employers: These are broad regimes that lower 
the transaction costs regarding controls and enforcement, and facilitate matching supply and demand. Their 
potential downside is that they are less tightly regulated by the participating States, as they are based on an 
a priori general agreement of facilitating migration flows within a given region.
(b) Bilateral mobility schemes between a country of origin and a country of destination that respond to specific 
labour market dynamics: Such bilateral regimes may regulate both seasonal/temporary needs in specific 
labour market sectors (e.g. agriculture or domestic work) and more long-term migration relationships 
between two sets of countries (e.g. the European Union (EU)–Morocco Mobility Partnership). They often 
follow pre-existing ties or current geopolitical priorities (as in the case of the Australia and New Zealand 
schemes addressing Pacific States, or as in the case of the Spain–Morocco seasonal migration programme).
(c) Sponsorship schemes that may facilitate entry and integration of the migrant and her/his family at destination: 
Such sponsorship schemes are manifold: they may concern a labour migrant who has a job offer (as happens 
in the various selective high-skilled migration schemes, particularly of Australia and Canada); a migrant 
seeking employment (hence legalizing what often happens informally through migration networks, as 
implemented experimentally in the late 1990s in Italy); or a refugee seeking resettlement in a third country 
(as currently happens in Canada). Sponsorship can be private (by families or individuals) or public (by the 
State) or indeed semi-public (e.g. by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)).
(d) Humanitarian corridors that aim at preventing highly vulnerable or stranded migrants from engaging in 
irregular migration with a view to arriving in a safe third country: Such corridors are targeted (and sometimes 
ad hoc) initiatives by civil society organizations in cooperation with destination countries, and aim at providing 
resettlement to people who need it. Here we also consider the potential of regularization mechanisms, 
recognizing the complex realities of international migration and the fact that sometimes migrants and their 
families fall through the cracks of administrative and enforcement systems. Seeking to avoid protracted 
situations of irregularity, regularization mechanisms remain a tool for addressing vulnerability in exceptional 
circumstances.
In the sections below, we briefly illustrate several policy schemes and regimes that have worked, and seek to 
identify how they could be improved. There is a need for bold decisions if we are to harness the opportunity 
that international migration brings to all parties involved when it is well managed. 
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2. DEFINING THE KEY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
While international migration affects a small percentage of the world’s population (3.4% in 2017),4 there is a 
significant number of people (730 million worldwide, equivalent to 14% of the world’s adult population) whose 
responses5 (in the period 2013–2016) indicated that, given the opportunity, they would like to migrate to 
another country. This percentage is on the rise compared with 2010–2012 (13% or 640 million) but lower than 
that registered in 2007–2009 (16%), notably before the onset of the global financial crisis. The most recent 
survey data6 show that desire to emigrate has risen in European countries outside the EU, in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa, but has remained overall stable in Asia, North America, 
and sub-Saharan Africa (although in the latter it is high, standing at approximately 30%). 
What we are witnessing and need to pay attention to is the changing nature of migration. Countries of origin 
and destination have diversified and multiplied. Migration no longer necessarily follows post-colonial routes 
nor does it depend on pre-established cultural, political or economic ties.7 The increase in international trade, 
the proliferation of global supply chains, the intensification of cultural and economic exchanges has led to new 
migrant pathways configurations.8 Within this context of multiple connections and paths, the existing migration 
and asylum regimes are under pressure while our distinction between asylum seekers and labour migrants as 
two separate categories becomes blurred.
2.1. Asylum seeking and (economically motivated) migration: A blurred line
In “both legal approaches and public imagination”, the lines between economic migrants and refugees are 
increasingly blurred.9 Although international agencies – such as the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the EU High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration – have 
acknowledged the “migration–asylum nexus”10, conventional assumptions in policymaking are challenged by the 
interrelationship between forced, semi-forced and voluntary migration. 
As McAuliffe rightly argues, the distinction between forced and voluntary migration should be better understood 
as a continuum along which migrants’ agency operates.11 Those standing at the extreme ends of the continuum 
may be rather clear-cut cases of forced and voluntary migration, with asylum seekers, refugees and other 
persons in need of international protection at one end and wealthy individuals with heightened choice and 
4 See the latest UN DESA International Migration Report, 2017.
5 Gallup World Poll on Migration Intentions, available from https://news.gallup.com/poll/211883/number-potential-migrants-
worldwide-tops-700-million.aspx (accessed 3 October 2018).
6 Ibid.
7 See also Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014, chapter 1 and chapter 3.
8 Triandafyllidou, 2018: chapter 1.
9 Dauvergne, 2004:601.
10 Van Hear, Brubaker and Bessa, 2009:8.
11 McAuliffe, 2018:219.
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mobility options at the other. However, “the many migrant experiences that occupy the middle (or grey) area 
are often not perceptibly different from each other with regard to agency”.12 For instance, people migrating from 
Bangladesh, Pakistan or India mainly for “economic” reasons may also have been pushed to do so for political 
reasons (because they belong to a lower caste or supported the “wrong” party or originate from the “wrong” 
clan of families).13
This blurring of traditional categories is compounded by the fact that asylum seekers and other migrants are 
increasingly able to use the same migratory routes. This is the so-called phenomenon of mixed migration. Van 
Hear and co-authors point out that “mixed migration” is primarily associated with policy agendas in (Western) 
destination countries and their concerns over irregular migration, border controls, unfounded asylum claims 
and the return of rejected asylum seekers.14 At the same time, Ottonelli and Torresi warn us about the need 
to acknowledge migrants’ agency and voluntariness, while also recognizing the limits of that agency and the 
conditions under which migration is forced.15
Apart from situations where “refugees and other migrants move alongside each other making use of the 
same routes and means of transport and engaging in the services of the same smugglers”, having close links in 
transit countries and similar experiences in destination ones, “mixed migration” may also refer to the changing 
character of movement along the way.16 For example, Koser reports on the intermingling of irregular migratory 
routes and smuggling to the West of Afghans and Pakistanis, the former generally eligible for asylum in the EU, 
the latter considered as driven by economic motives.17 Dimitriadi also documents such conflation when studying 
the transit of irregular migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh via Turkey to Greece.18 Van Hear, 
Brubaker and Bessa offer a similar example of how refugees may use established routes for both migration 
and trade, using the example of Afghans who often embark on their journey to Europe from refugee camps 
in Pakistan, while those finding refuge in Iraq become labour migrants.19 It thus features at all stages of the 
migration process: the root causes leading people out of their countries may be mixed, as may also be people’s 
motivations to move, while motivations may change over time. 
2.2. Regular versus irregular migration: Shades of grey
While the distinction between regular versus irregular migration may appear as a black and white categorization, 
reality on the ground is much more complex, and can better be conceptualized as different shades of grey.20 
Patterns of irregularity are diverse and can include people who unlawfully crossed a border undetected, as well 
as visa overstayers, children born to undocumented parents, migrants who lost their legal status, and rejected 
asylum seekers. What is common in all these different circumstances is that the persons concerned continue to 
reside irregularly in the host country.
Irregularity is not entirely of the migrant’s making: it may have to do with red tape or labour market dynamics 
that encourage irregular stay and irregular work (including that of employers who may see benefit in hiring cheap, 
12 Ibid.
13 Triandafyllidou, 2017.
14 Van Hear, Brubaker and Bessa, 2009:10.
15 Ottonelli and Torresi, 2013.
16 Van Hear, Brubaker and Bessa, 2009:9–10, 12.
17 Koser, 2010.
18 Dimitriadi, 2013.
19 Van Hear, Brubaker and Bessa, 2009.
20 Triandafyllidou and Bartolini, 2019.
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often exploited, labour). Researchers have coined the term “befallen irregularity”21 to specifically characterize 
the cases in which migrants in Southern Europe fell to irregular status because of red tape around stay or work 
requirements that were impossible to fulfil. The term “befallen irregularity” or “semi-legality”22 is also used to 
emphasize the fact that migrants may alternate periods of regular stay and work with periods of irregular stay 
and irregular work, and may live in conditions of partial regular status – e.g. with the right to stay although not 
to work, or participate in a regularization programme yet eventually fail to fulfil all the conditions and obtain 
a legal status – or they may have “tolerated” status (irregular but not deportable to their country of origin).23 
Additionally, research has shown that irregularity is functional to labour market conditions in specific sectors 
such as construction, domestic work, agriculture and the food industry, as irregular migrant workers provide 
a cheap and plentiful workforce.24 In other words, by setting requirements for regular stay and work that 
are impossible to meet, States indirectly support the interests of unscrupulous employers and create ethnic 
segmentation and hierarchies in the labour market that are functional to the national economy.25
Box 1: Types of irregular status 
 ■ Migrants who have irregularly entered the country by either physically avoiding formal immigration control or 
presenting false papers;
 ■ Migrants who regularly entered the country for a fixed period that has expired; they did not renew their 
permission to stay and are therefore unlawful overstayers;
 ■ Migrants who are lawfully entitled to reside in the country, but are in breach of some visa condition, notably by 
working more than their immigration status permits;
 ■ Asylum seekers who regularly entered the country to pursue a case for refugee status, but who remain despite 
a final decision refusing them a continuing right to remain;
 ■ Children born in the country to such “irregular migrants” and who also lack a right to remain, although they are 
not themselves migrants.
Source: Gordon et al., 2009.
2.3. Key issues and challenges 
Following from the above observations, it is clear that there can be no reliable and comprehensive data on 
irregular migration stocks and flows. This makes it particularly difficult to assess the effectiveness, for instance, 
of enforcement policies, or of new visa options or new channels of regular migration in discouraging irregular 
flows. Similarly, the lack of detailed data on irregular migrants’ employment prevents us from fully grasping 
how they may interact with labour market dynamics. In addition, it is particularly difficult to assess causality 
21 González Enríquez, 2014; Vickstrom, 2014.
22 Kubal, 2013.
23 Irregular migrants are often not completely deprived of formal papers that testify to their presence in a country. Recent studies 
(Vasta, 2008; Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014) have shown that irregular migrants may possess legal documents such as 
social security numbers, work contracts, certificates of enrolment for their children in school, or local identity cards issued by 
municipalities, while still not having a regular stay permit. Such documents testify to the de facto inclusion of the migrant in the 
labour market and social life, and are important in illustrating the dynamism and complexity of the irregular migration phenomenon 
as well as the fragmentation of its governance. A typical example of such fragmentation comes from Spain, where municipalities 
require all migrants to register with the local registry, the padrón, even if they do not have regular stay permits, which are issued by 
the national administration.
24 Jordan and Düvell, 2002.
25 Papademetriou, 2014.
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when a change happens. There is certainly a need here for inventive research strategies that would use a 
comparative case study approach to delve into the dynamics of specific phenomena and then seek to draw 
more general conclusions about what works in terms of policies discouraging and preventing irregular migration 
and encouraging regular migration. 
A key policy priority that emerges from our analysis is the need to design and implement more efficient migration 
management regimes. The aim is to lower the transaction costs of border controls and enforcement, while 
providing for the needs of labour markets, yet also protecting the rights of both native workers and migrants. 
Building on McAuliffe,26 we can identify several groups of potential migrants that may engage in regular or 
irregular migration pathways. 
Box 2: Potential migrant populations who may use regular or irregular pathways
International migrants entering via regulated channels such as family or high-skilled programmes: Prospective 
migrants at countries of origin who are likely to engage in legal migration because they have the necessary human, 
material, and social capital; for instance, they fit some privileged category aimed at attracting highly skilled migrants 
or investors, or through family-related channels.
Overstayers: Prospective migrants in countries of origin who may apply for one type of visa (such as a tourist or 
student visa) and then breach their visa conditions and overstay, engaging in unauthorized work.
Refugees and rejected asylum seekers: Asylum seekers who apply for asylum upon entry into the country 
of destination may be recognized as refugees and receive protection (whether full refugee status or subsidiary/
temporary protection) or may be rejected. Those rejected will receive an invitation to leave the destination country 
within a short period of time, but may opt to abscond and convert into irregular migrants. 
Discouraged asylum seekers: People who may seek international protection but consider their chances of obtaining 
it slim and thus opt for migration channels. The Jayasuriya study27 of Sri Lankans is telling in this respect, as he shows 
that Sri Lankans who assess their chances of obtaining protection in Australia as minimal may eventually opt for low-
skill temporary migration to the Gulf region.
People engaging in irregular entry: Prospective migrants may opt directly for irregular migration channels, often 
using the services of migrant smugglers if they consider that there are no regular pathways available to them.
27
The above categories suggest that regular and irregular migration are interrelated through multiple connections 
and that there is an interactive, dynamic relationship between migrant motivations and needs, policy options 
and channels, and intermediate factors (resources) that eventually tip the balance towards one outcome or 
the other. As Hernandez argues, when insecurity and poverty are protracted, populations facing these harsh 
conditions are likely to seek solutions in irregular migration (if regular channels are not available), particularly 
if there have been previous such experiences in their environment (such as with Central American youth and 
related migration experience in the United States).28 The challenge for policymakers remains to encourage 
potential migrant populations to engage with regular rather than irregular pathways.
Building on the above observations, we assess below first the impact of enhanced regional mobility regimes.
26 McAuliffe, 2018:226.
27 Jayasuriya, 2016; see also Jayasuriya, McAuliffe and Iqbal, 2016.
28 Hernandez, 2015.
73. REGIONAL MOBILITY REGIMES
International migration is by definition a transnational phenomenon, but migration governance remains largely 
a matter of national sovereignty in the absence of a formal multilateral institutional framework at the global 
level.29 However, countries bound together in the same world region by social, economic and geopolitical ties 
may decide to govern migration regionally through a common set of rules that facilitate free mobility. They thus 
mutually abolish national borders within the region and allow for migrant workers and their families to move, 
find employment and settle in each other’s territory. Such regimes resolve the challenge of irregular migration at 
its source: they regularize all forms of movement and regulate them as if they were internal migration. Naturally, 
some provisions and obligations apply, such as registration with local authorities at destination, fulfilment of 
some requirements (such as having health insurance or registering with a local scheme, having a registered 
home address, and abiding by the host country’s labour and other regulations). Such enhanced regional mobility 
schemes, of course, may appear as too ambitious or too risky in their implementation, as they require a high 
level of political will, administrative capacity and regional cooperation at several levels, but they can be a smart 
move, reducing costs and facilitating the matching of labour supply and demand, while also creating a level 
playing field, protecting rights throughout different labour market sectors. 
Perhaps the most advanced such regional mobility scheme is that of the European Union (EU). However, 
in the case of the EU, the right to reside and work in another member State arises from the common EU 
citizenship that citizens of Member States enjoy (as a function of their national citizenship in one Member State). 
Thus, in this case, all relevant intra-EU mobility issues relate to EU citizens’ rights and their implementation in 
practice. The focus of this section goes beyond this specific mobility regime to briefly assess the experiences of 
three world regions where efforts to regulate migration through enhanced regional mobility regimes have been 
implemented, to different degrees, notably South-East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and South America. 
Indeed, broader economic integration goals and trade liberalization have played significant roles in the 
development of mobility regimes in all three cases discussed here. While labour flows within ASEAN are 
directly linked to trade and economic exchanges, the South American countries participating in MERCOSUR 
have developed much broader approaches to migration, recognizing social rights for migrants’ intraregions30 
and allowing all types of workers to move freely and benefit from social rights and security protection in host 
countries.31 Despite free movement protocol rights and visa liberalization linked to labour mobility, ECOWAS 
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) still suffer from poor implementation, due to 
lack of coherence and harmonization of legal frameworks and social security regimes among the participating 
countries.32
29 McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018; Betts, 2011; Hansen, Koehler and Money, 2011.
30 Jurje and Lavenex, 2015.
31 Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes, 2014.
32 International Labour Organization (ILO), 2015a.
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The critical overview below briefly assesses the different approaches to skilled and unskilled migration in regions 
that implement enhanced labour mobility regimes. Our aim is to show whether these approaches help stem 
irregularity at all skill levels or whether they leave unskilled labour migration at the margins, and what are the 
main challenges that these regions face in implementing enhanced regional mobility regimes.
For further information on regional mobility agreements, please see:
ASEAN high-skilled mobility agreement webpage: 
www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2016/05/13/asean-labor-mobility.html
ECOWAS travel section:
www.ecowas.int/life-in-the-community/ 
MERCOSUR residence webpage: 
www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/6425/11/innova.front/residir-y-trabajar-en-el-mercosur
3.1. South-East Asia
South-East Asia has been characterized by important labour migration inflows and outflows since the 1970s. 
There are currently approximately 10 million international immigrants residing in the subregion and just over 
20 million emigrants. Of those emigrants, 6.9 million have gone to another country within the South-East Asia 
subregion, thus accounting for nearly 70 per cent of the total immigrant population in the region. This shows 
the huge importance of intraregional flows in South-East Asia.
ASEAN was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It has since expanded 
to include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam. It is a 
regional intergovernmental organization that aims to promote cooperation and facilitate economic growth and 
social progress among its members.
There are two major migration corridors characterizing the ASEAN Member States: the archipelagic corridor 
and the Mekong River corridor. The first has been mainly used by Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore 
to attract workers from Indonesia and the Philippines, while the second is used by workers from the Mekong 
banks, such as those from Myanmar, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam to reach 
Thailand.33 
 Since the early 1990s, ASEAN has implemented temporary migration programmes for promoting labour mobility 
among its citizens via bilateral agreements or Memoranda of Understanding among the partner countries. 
The aim was to coordinate the need for low-skilled workers and introduce legal admission schemes.34 While 
highly skilled migrants have experienced favourable conditions in local labour markets, low-skilled migrants have 
faced important restrictions in entering the job market, even if their work was and still is important for local 
and national economies. Some bilateral Memoranda of Understanding have included provisions for standard 
contracts (e.g. the Memoranda of Understanding signed between Malaysia and Indonesia (2011), Bangladesh 
(2016), Viet Nam (2015) and Cambodia (2017))35, as a way of improving labour conditions for the nationals of 
these countries. 
33 Kaur, 2018.
34 Kaur, 2018; Wickramasekara, 2015.
35 ILO, 2018.
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The development of labour markets in ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Singapore, plus growing 
competition among countries, have led to the creation of labour mobility priorities for the ASEAN Economic 
Community, facilitating the movement of service providers under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services with tradable quotas for recruiting workers, mutual recognition agreements and free mobility schemes 
among its signatories.36
The facilitation of skilled labour movement within the ASEAN region set up by the ASEAN Framework 
Agreements on Services and the mutual recognition agreements has been associated with an effective increase 
in the cross-border movement of mainly skilled workers.37 In particular, the eight different mutual recognition 
agreements ratified on engineering, nursing, architecture, medicine, dentistry, tourism, surveying and accountancy 
have played a role, even though they cover only 1.5 per cent of the region’s workforce, and hence could only 
be seen as a starting point for facilitating internal mobility.38 Nevertheless, positive effects have been registered 
by the mutual recognition agreement on tourism professionals, ratified by ASEAN countries in 2010, which has 
boosted employment rates for Cambodian and Indonesian tourism professionals within their own countries, as 
it has increased awareness of their specific professional category.39
The creation of ASEAN and its intraregional mobility regime has benefitted the destination countries by facilitating 
skilled mobility connected to trade, but seems to have exacerbated labour rights violations and discrimination 
that low-skill migrant workers face, especially in agriculture, domestic and care work, and manufacturing.40 A 
well-known example is that of the Thai fisheries that have been employing young men from Cambodia, Myanmar, 
and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic under appalling conditions.41 The situation of these “prawn slaves” 
has been known to the authorities and largely denounced by non-governmental organizations and international 
organizations, and while some actions have been taken by the respective governments, the trafficking and 
exploitation of these migrant workers continue. The involvement of political actors in the case, weak law 
enforcement, and corruption of the courts have so far thwarted any efforts to change the situation, despite the 
high visibility of the plight of these workers across the region and even internationally.42 The ASEAN regional 
mobility regime needs to be improved by action on two fronts: further liberalizing the movement of persons43 
and preventing migrant worker abuse and trafficking of human beings in the area related to employment in the 
low-skill sectors.44 Marschke and Vandergeest point to the need to improve migration management in Thailand 
by enabling migrants to easily register in the country, change employers, and limit the role of employment 
brokers.45 Perhaps these guidelines could be further adopted in the wider ASEAN region. Indeed, the recent 
ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers indicates ASEAN’s 
acknowledgement of the issue, and steps are being taken in the right direction. 
3.2. Sub-Saharan Africa
While Western media focus on sub-Saharan African migration towards the global North, the significant 
intraregional migration that takes place in the African continent risks passing unnoticed in Europe and North 
36 Kaur, 2018; Nonnenmacher, 2017.
37 Nonnenmacher, 2017.
38 ASEAN, 2016.
39 AADCP and ASEAN, 2015; Papademetriou et al., 2015.
40 Kaur, 2004, 2018; McAuliffe, 2016; Hugo, 2014; Piper, 2005.
41 McAuliffe, 2018.
42 ILO, 2014.
43 Nonnenmacher, 2017.
44 Amnesty International, 2015.
45 Marschke and Vandergeest, 2016.
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America. In 2017, there were an estimated 19.4 million Africans living in another African country (representing 
1.5% of the total resident population).46 In addition, there were approximately 20 million displaced and stateless 
people living in Africa, including 5.6 million refugees and asylum seekers, approximately 13.2 million internally 
displaced persons and returnees, and 715,000 stateless people.47 The continent is characterized by high degrees 
of political instability triggered by conflict, terrorism and climate change leading to internal, intraregional and 
international migration pressures.48
Figure 1: Intraregional migration in West and Central Africa
Source: DTM database, IOM, 2018.
The African Union, composed of all 55 countries on the African continent, has recently published the latest 
version of its Migration Policy Framework (2018–2027), revising the previous one adopted in 2006. The African 
Union adopted the Joint Labour Migration Programme, which seeks to facilitate the mobility and free movement 
of workers as a means of advancing regional integration and development, including skills portability and the 
mutual recognition of qualifications.49 Most sub-Saharan African countries face labour and skills shortages in 
specific sectors, while at the same time struggle with high levels of unemployment and a growing youth bulge.50 
At a March 2018 meeting in Kigali, Uganda, 44 African Union member countries out of 55 signed the proposed 
agreement for an African Continental Free Trade Area, also adopting the Free Movement of Persons Protocol. 
Harmonizing labour policies in the region, avoiding brain drain, and countering irregular migration and trafficking 
in human beings are four of the main intraregional migration-related policy challenges that the African continent 
faces today.51 In the face of these challenges, issuing an African passport is one of the flagship projects of the 
African Union’s agenda for 2063.52
46 IOM, 2017; UN DESA, 2017.
47 UNHCR, 2016.
48 Okyerefo and Boatema, 2018.
49 The African Union adopted the Joint Labour Migration Programme in 2015. Its implementation is part of the labour migration 
strategy of the revised Migration Policy Framework, adopted in 2016 and covering the period 2018–2027) (see African Union, 
2018).
50 ILO, 2010.
51 African Union, 2018.
52 Ibid.
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Further examples of regional mobility schemes favouring labour migration within the African continent include 
ECOWAS,53 established in 1975 with a view to regulating the free movement of persons.54 According to 
the latest estimates, Western Africa has been hosting the largest number of international migrants in the 
African continent, with around 6.7 million people, representing 2 per cent of its total population.55 According to 
multiple authors56, it is one of the sub-Saharan regions to have recorded the most significant results regarding 
the creation of an area of free movement of persons, even though its implementation thus far has not been 
entirely successful.57 The data show that 84 per  cent of migration movements in West Africa are directed 
towards another country in the region. This means that intraregional migration in West Africa is seven times 
higher than flows from West African countries to other parts of the world.58 
While ECOWAS entry visas for member State nationals have been effectively abolished, only 7 out of the 15 
participating countries have issued the travel document, which is valid across the region, while the existing travel 
document must still, in the long term, be replaced by an ECOWAS passport. This has yet to be issued in most 
of the ECOWAS member States.59 These administrative hurdles also hamper the collection of relevant data 
that would allow one to understand whether and how the ECOWAS mobility regime affects irregular migration 
flows. Despite the provision of equal treatment for employment inserted in the ECOWAS Free Movement 
Protocols, member States’ nationals are still exposed to discriminatory practices.60 
Free and flexible labour migration is a reality in large areas of the African continent61: intraregional mobility 
involves more than four out of five migrants in ECOWAS62, but this also has implications for migrant-smuggling. 
Indeed, West Africans can start their journeys under the provisions for free movement and then, leaving the 
ECOWAS area, may use the services of smuggling networks to migrate further.63 Despite the presence of 
regional agreements such as ECOWAS, the right of free movement in the area is poorly implemented or 
contradicted by national legislation of member States to migrants’ disadvantage.64 
Africa’s aggregate growth is projected to rise to 3.2 per cent in 2018 and 3.5 per cent in 2019, but its regional 
potential is still underexploited – particularly in the sub-Saharan region – in terms of infrastructure development, 
trade and mobility.65 Moreover, by 2050, 59 per cent of Africa’s population is expected to be urban and over 
70 per cent of West Africans are likely to live in urban areas:66 enhancing mobility and regular pathways could 
lead to greater economic prosperity.
This brief overview suggests that the two main regional mobility schemes in sub-Saharan African, notably the 
African Union and ECOWAS, have sought to promote free intraregional mobility, although most of these 
53 Formed by Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
54 Kabbanji, 2017.
55 UN DESA, 2017.
56 IOM, 2018a; Flahaux and de Haas, 2016; Touzenis, 2012.
57 Kabbanji, 2017.
58 Sahel and West African Club and OECD, 2006.
59 Kabbanji, 2017.
60 Devillard, Bacchi and Noack, 2016.
61 Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.
62 ILO, 2015a.
63 Carling, 2016.
64 Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.
65 World Bank, 2017.
66 UN DESA, 2018; Bello-Schünemann and Aucoin, 2016.
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provisions remain on paper because of the lack of political will and administrative capacity to implement the 
relevant measures, notably the issuing of a regional passport, the streamlining of portability of skills, recognition 
of qualifications and the guaranteeing of basic labour rights.
3.3. South America
In 2017, there were approximately 3,986,756 intraregional migrants in South America, a number that increased 
by 11 per cent from 2010 to 2015. The figure represents 70 per cent of all migration in the region and accounts 
for 1.4 per cent of the total population.67 As early as 1969, the Andean Community68 had tried to regulate 
intraregional migration with little success.69 Free movement was also introduced in the agenda of MERCOSUR, 
the regional organization established in 1991.70
The MERCOSUR Residence Agreement was adopted in 2002, albeit unimplemented until 2009. The Agreement’s 
main objective is to facilitate intraregional migration by establishing a regional migration regime for South 
Americans: any national of a MERCOSUR or associate member State may reside and work for a period of 
two years in another MERCOSUR State. After two years, if the person demonstrates adequate means for 
supporting herself/himself and her/his family, the temporary residence permit can become a permanent one 
for the host State. All countries in South America, not only MERCOSUR countries, have ratified the agreement 
and implement it today (with the exception of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Suriname and Guyana).71 
The MERCOSUR agreement resembles the EU citizenship framework, which provides for EU citizens (i.e. 
citizens of the EU Member States)72 the right to move and settle in another EU Member State. In contrast to 
the EU citizenship framework, where responsibility to prove that a mobile EU citizen is a threat to public order 
rests with the Member State, in the MERCOSUR framework, citizens have to prove individually that they are 
not a threat to public policy or security. The agreement otherwise provides equal treatment with regard to 
all social, economic and cultural rights to these migrants, such as the right to equal working conditions, family 
reunification, and access to education for their children. 
The MERCOSUR agreement’s main objective was to resolve intraregional irregular migration. The development 
of intraregional trade or of a single market was less of a priority, also taking into consideration the large degree 
of informality affecting some sectors in the South American labour market – nearly half of all non-agricultural 
workers in urban centres work informally. According to IOM data, approximately 2 million South Americans 
obtained temporary residence permits during the period 2004–2014 in one of the nine countries implementing 
the agreement. This value cannot be seen necessarily as an increase in regional flows due to the agreements, 
given that a large number of people obtaining the permits were already residents in the host country when 
it came into force.73 The region is now moving toward the creation of a South American citizenship, putting 
67 UN DESA, 2015.
68 Formed by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru.
69 Acosta Arcarazo and Feline Freier, 2015; Bernal, Prada and Urueña, 2015; Acosta Arcarazo, 2014, 2016.
70 Including as full members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (although the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela is currently suspended); and as associate partners the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Peru.
71 Acosta Arcarazo and Feline Freier, 2015; Acosta Arcarazo, 2014, 2016.
72 The EU includes the following 28 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (only until 2019).
73 Acosta Arcarazo, 2016.
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emphasis on migrants’ civil rights.74 This paradigm shift in South America is related to a number of factors: the 
restoration of democracy after years under military dictatorships, mass emigrations after the repeated periods 
of economic downturn, and the willingness of national governments to introduce social rights in their agendas.75
While the MERCOSUR residence agreement includes several positive elements, including its emphasis on 
facilitating legal labour migration and the respect of migrant workers’ rights, there are still several shortcomings 
with regard to its implementation, notably that several countries apply restrictions to the validity of the 
agreement.76 Chile, for instance, does not apply the agreement to Colombians, Ecuadorans or Peruvians. On 
the other hand, there are also expansive interpretations of the agreement; for example, Uruguay grants a 
permanent residence permit without a waiting period of two years, while Argentina includes in the residence 
agreement provisions to citizens from Guyana, Suriname and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, thus the 
whole of the South American continent. Such an extension was also implemented by Brazil in March 2017 with 
immediate effect for citizens of French Guiana, Guyana, Suriname and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.77 
Further research is needed to understand the quantitative (increase or decrease) and qualitative (improvement 
of labour situation and rights) effects of the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement on intraregional migration flows 
in South America. However, what remains clear is that, for both political and economic reasons, the region is 
heading towards further mobility integration.78
3.4. Key findings on regional mobility regimes
Our review of three enhanced regional mobility regimes suggests some key factors that need to be taken into 
account in assessing the effectiveness of these programmes: 
(a) The size of intraregional migration as a percentage of overall migration flows, representing approximately 
70 per cent in South America and South-East Asia, and 84 per cent in West Africa.
(b) Socioeconomic disparities among countries in the region and the emergence of specific countries as main 
destinations: This is the case of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in South–East Asia, and Argentina in South 
America.79
(c) The role of political parties, governments and regional organizations in driving the process: It is clear 
that, in sub-Saharan Africa, while the facilitation of regional mobility has been identified as a priority area 
for over a decade, there is little political will to pursue the issue and implement the policy effectively. By 
contrast, in South America, coalitions built under populist regimes have favoured the emergence of a 
regional mobility regime.
(d) The emphasis put on labour and human rights: While in South America the impetus of regional mobility 
facilitation has been matched by a renewed emphasis on human rights and anti-discrimination policies, in 
other regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa or South-East Asia, less attention is paid to issues of human rights 
and social protection.
74 Gallinati and Gavazzo, 2017.
75 Acosta Arcarazo and Feline Freier, 2015.
76 Ibid.
77 See “Residence program reinstituted for bordering countries’ nationals”. Available from www.balglobal.com/bal-news/residence-
program-reinstituted-for-bordering-countries-nationals/ (accessed 4 October 2018).
78 Acosta Arcarazo and Feline Freier, 2015.
79 IOM, 2017.
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Enhanced regional mobility regimes can be a smart and balanced approach to regulating migration, as they bring 
down national barriers to smooth intraregional mobility, and thus can tackle irregular migration at the source, 
while also providing for an overarching framework regulating employer–employee relations and overall access to 
services and rights for migrants and their families. However, for such regimes to be truly successful and effective, 
there has to be special emphasis on benefiting unskilled workers and their families too, and not just highly skilled 
migrants.
The three regions discussed above are seeking to further their economic and political cooperation by facilitating 
the movement of persons. Naturally, differences in labour markets are reflected in the direction of the flows 
(some countries in these regions act as “magnets” for intraregional migrant workers). Our brief critical overview 
suggests that enhanced regional mobility regimes can be effective when coupled with strong political will and a 
certain implementation capacity by the participating States. Socioeconomic inequalities among the participating 
States seem less of an issue, provided relevant monitors and safeguards are implemented to avoid situations 
of severe exploitation and outright human trafficking to emerge under the guise of facilitated labour mobility. 
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4. BILATERAL MOBILITY SCHEMES
While enhanced mobility regimes may be more ambitious, bilateral agreements between governments of origin 
and destination countries can be more effective in fostering mutual understanding and cooperation in the field 
of migration management. Bilateral partnerships support synergies between different actors involved in the 
design and implementation of the emigration/immigration policy within each of the two countries involved while 
avoiding the complications of a region-wide scheme. They perhaps better fulfil our suggestion for a variable 
geometry approach, focusing on specific supply-and-demand dynamics. 
In Europe, specific EU Member States have signed bilateral agreements with third countries (i.e. non EU) 
with which they have a long history of economic and cultural ties, which may also include labour mobility. A 
typical example is the case of Spain and Morocco, illustrated below, which started as a bilateral agreement 
between two neighbouring countries and led to an enhanced bilateral scheme between Morocco and several 
EU countries under the framework of the EU’s Mobility Partnerships.80 
Box 3: From a bilateral agreement to an EU Mobility Partnership: The case of Morocco
Spain and Morocco signed an agreement on labour migration in 2001, effectively implemented since 2005, to facilitate 
repeated seasonal migration (notably circular migration) between Morocco and southern Spain, to cater to the needs 
of Spanish agriculture.81 The agreement allowed for Moroccan agricultural labourers to work in Spain for periods 
of up to six months per calendar year. The migrant workers committed to respect the terms of employment – 
which usually included agreements on salaries, accommodation, etc. – while compliant workers were likely to be 
employed for several years. The implementation of the agreement was gradually improved and the processing of the 
applications became increasingly smoother, thus facilitating the demand for seasonal migrant workers in southern 
Spain and responding to the demand of low-skilled Moroccan workers (oftentimes women) for an additional source 
of income. The agreement does not allow for these migrant workers to shift to long-term residence status.
The Spain–Morocco agreement largely fell into disuse as jobs in agriculture became desirable for a growing number 
of unemployed native and settled migrant workers in Spain after the onset of the economic crisis.82 A few years later, 
in 2013, a broader Mobility Partnership Agreement was signed between several EU Member States (notably, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) and Morocco.83 The EU–
Morocco Mobility Partnership Agreement was achieved after lengthy discussions and significant leverage exercised 
on the part of Morocco. Recent studies have shown how such tripartite negotiations among Member States, the EU 
and third countries depend at least on the balance between the cost of non-agreement and any other partnership 
options,84 and on the balance of power among all stakeholders involved.85
81 82 83 84 85
80 Council of the European Union, 2013.
81 González Enríquez and Reynés Ramón, 2011.
82 González Enríquez, 2013.
83 Council of the European Union, 2013.
84 Reslow and Vink, 2015.
85 Kunz and Maisenbacher, 2013.
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Bilateral mobility agreements are driven both by pre-existing socioeconomic relations and previous flows of 
migrants between two countries, as well as by considerations on the costs of the absence of such facilitation 
agreements in terms of border enforcement, labour market regulation and protection of labour rights. It is 
no surprise that Switzerland has also privileged the signature (starting in 2008) of bilateral mobility schemes 
with several countries or areas of origin – notably Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo86 in its 
immediate neighbourhood, but also Nigeria and Tunisia – further geographically, albeit important as migrant 
origin countries.87 
Some of these partnerships explicitly try to engage non-State actors and look at diasporas as co-development 
agents, thus connecting countries of origin and of destination.88 Also, most include a mix of measures to repress 
unsolicited (irregular) migration flows, facilitate return and reintegration, and foster work migration for specific 
economic sectors and skill levels. These are approaches that put into practice the idea of variable geometry, 
notably providing tailored schemes for specific countries or regions, and sectors where the offer of labour force 
from origin countries can be channelled into destination countries. Such schemes are often part of a broader 
bilateral strategy to enhance coordination and coherence across different policy domains.
Bilateral agreements, especially regarding seasonal and temporary migration, are also common in different parts 
of the world. Some of these, as in the case of Australia, operate on a bilateral basis with countries in the region, 
while other schemes are based on labour market testing and assessment of the job offer, as in the case of the 
Labour Market Impact Assessment, applied for permanent and temporary job positions.89 
In the Pacific region, New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme and Australia’s Seasonal Worker 
Program have gained attention as two good examples of schemes to manage temporary labour migration 
in ways that benefit both origin and destination countries as well as the migrants themselves. Implemented 
as migration policy tools, these two schemes have also transformed bilateral relations among participating 
countries in other policy domains, especially trade.90 Indeed, these two schemes entail a complex system of 
relationships among different stakeholders that has required continuous engagement by all parties to ensure all 
components are properly maintained throughout the years.91 
Box 4: New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme 
Established in 2006 and launched in 2007, New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer schemes were initially 
developed with five Pacific States – Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, Kiribati and Tuvalu – and followed by an agreement with 
the Solomon Islands in 2008 and later the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and 
the Marshall Islands.92 The schemes allow the horticulture and viticulture sectors to recruit workers from overseas 
for seasonal labour when there are not enough national workers available. The limit on the number of Recognised 
Seasonal Employer places per year was initially set at 5,000 in 2007 and reached 11,100 in 201793 to respond to 
increased demand from employers. Workers within the scheme can spend a maximum of 7 months out of an 
11-month period in New Zealand (9 months for migrants from Kiribati and Tuvalu). 
92 93
86 References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
87 McGregor, Marchand and Siegel, 2015.
88 Bauböck and Faist, 2010.
89 OECD, 2016.
90 Bedford et al., 2017.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 See www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/research-and-statistics/research-reports/recognised-seasonal-employer-rse-scheme 
(accessed 4 October 2018).
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Scholars in the region often refer to New Zealand’s scheme as a triple win, as it benefits the host country, 
individual workers in terms of skills and revenues, and the origin countries receiving remittances and to which 
migrants with enhanced skills return.94 Similarly, the Australian scheme was announced in 2008 and started as a 
three-year pilot in 2009: approved employers can choose to recruit seasonal workers from Kiribati, Papua New 
Guinea, Tonga and Vanuatu to work in the agricultural sector in the harvesting period.95 In 2011, the programme 
was extended to new countries and adjusted to reach an increased number of workers by not limiting their 
employability to the agricultural sector, but also allowing quotas for some industries.96 
Canada has implemented seasonal workers’ schemes for recruitment in the agricultural sector since 1966.97 
Over the decades, these schemes have grown: in 2010, nearly 30,000 workers from Mexico and the Caribbean 
region were requested by Canadian employers for a maximum of eight months of work per year.98 Migrant 
selection criteria vary, depending on the origin country, but main features on contracts, maximum length of 
stay and return upon end of the contract (with transport arranged by employers) are common throughout 
the country. 
From the country of origin’s perspective, the Philippines’ active emigration policy management presents an 
interesting case. According to ILO, approximately 800,000 workers leave the country temporarily to work 
overseas under such agreements.99 The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, which provides 
orientation and recruitment services for prospective seasonal labour migrants, monitors work conditions and 
contracts, and manages agreements with dozens of destination countries.100
4.1. Responding to demand for domestic and care workers 
Bilateral mobility schemes can also be sector-specific, focusing on a specific labour market segment where 
demand for migrant labour is high. While the examples discussed above concern primarily seasonal work in 
agriculture and related sectors, we turn here to the domestic and care work sector, with a view to highlighting 
some interesting policy examples from Europe.
According to ILO, 80 per  cent of migrant domestic workers are concentrated in high-income countries 
(9.1 million of the estimated 11.5 million).101 There has been significant research work on the international 
division of reproductive work and global care chains paying special attention to how domestic work has become 
a main sector of employment opportunities abroad for Filipino women102 while Ehrenreich and Hochschild 
have theorized on the new economy of nannies and maids.103 The growth of paid domestic work in many 
European and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries is associated with 
the increased labour market participation of (native) women.104 Their greater flexibility and availability to work 
94 Ramasamy et al., 2008.
95 ILO, 2012.
96 ILO, 2012:12.
97 IICA, 2017.
98 ILO, 2012.
99 Ibid.
100 Ruiz, 2008.
101 ILO, 2015b.
102 Parrenas, 2001, 2008; Anderson, 2000; Lan, 2006.
103 Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2002.
104 Kofman and Raghuram, 2009.
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outside the home depend in the abstract on the provision of care and domestic services105 by someone else. 
Especially in countries where there is low male participation in reproductive roles and household chores, the 
availability of cheap, irregular work to provide for domestic and care work at home has allowed more women 
to find paid employment outside the home.106 
Opening up legal migration channels for workers in the care and domestic sectors, where demand is high and 
local supply is low, can generally be easier to implement, being more favourably seen by public opinion than 
others.107 Such sectorial migration channels can be regulated through bilateral agreements (between specific 
countries of origin and destination) or through regional agreements (for instance, between a number of European 
Union countries and one or more countries of origin) or they may arise from more general arrangements for 
circular migration. The case of Poland and its eastern neighbours, as well as that of Italy and its job-sharing 
regulation for domestic and care work, offer interesting insights.
Box 5: Regulated circularity between neighbouring countries
The case of Poland is particularly interesting, as circular migration arrangements were initially introduced for 
agriculture only and were limited to Ukrainian temporary workers. However, in 2006, the regime was expanded to 
include Georgian and Moldovan citizens who could stay and work in Poland, with a simple registration, for a period of 
six months within a year.108 This arrangement offered much-needed flexibility between these neighbouring countries 
catering to migrant women workers in domestic services, nursing, cleaning, migrant men workers in construction, 
and both men and women in agriculture. The common features in these sectors were the low-skilled or semi-skilled 
type of work, and the circularity of the migratory movement, which allowed Ukrainian migrants to combine work 
or family commitments in the home country with periods of employment abroad. The geographical proximity of the 
two countries naturally facilitated the circularity of the movement. Problems arose when some migrants sought to 
settle in Poland. The passage from simple circularity to more long-term migration was not foreseen in that scheme.
108
The case of Italy differs from that of Poland, as circularity emerged out of a job-sharing possibility codified in 
the national agreements for domestic and care work (2007, renewed in 2013 and in 2017, currently valid until 
May 2019). 
Box 6: Job-sharing among migrant domestic workers in Italy
The possibility of job-sharing was introduced by the 2007 National Agreement on Domestic and Care Work of 2007 
in Italy, and was initially inspired by the necessity of two workers to cover a 24-hour shift for a person in need of 
intensive care. It thus allowed the employer to hire the two workers with one contract. As pointed out by Marchetti, 
this led to the emergence in some cases of a rotating pattern for migrant live-in care workers: each worker would 
spend three months in the destination country in full-time employment and three months at home taking care of the 
family or other obligations.109 Marchetti points out that this was seen as a “luxury” arrangement for well-integrated 
migrant domestic workers who had been tired by full-time work as live-in caregivers and could afford the circularity.110 
In other words, this circularity came after a period of full insertion in the destination country’s labour market. Such 
arrangements of three-month or six-month shifts of live-in workers or of circulation between neighbouring countries 
can cater to the needs of both migrant domestic and care workers and those of the families employing them, while 
reducing red tape and excessive regulation costs that could be a disincentive, especially for employers.
105 The turn towards paid care in Europe, however, has also been caused by ageing societies, along with the restructuring of long-
term care provision. Different countries have opted for different solutions to these contrasted pressures (increased care needs 
and welfare cuts) in relation to previous regimes that ranged from systems that largely relied on the non-paid assistance of family 
members (particularly women), as in Italy or Spain, to publicly-provided assistance, as in Belgium, Slovenia or Czechia. 
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The common element in both examples above is that the regulation codified ex post a matching supply and 
demand that existed on the ground. In the case of Poland and its eastern neighbours, the flexible circularity 
scheme responded to the needs of low-skilled employment sectors taking advantage of differences in the cost 
of living between the two countries. The money earned through temporary low-skilled jobs in Poland was an 
important additional source of income for Ukrainians back home. In the case of Italy, the income differential 
was higher and hence offset the costs of travelling a longer distance between the two countries. Interestingly, 
the job-sharing principle in Italy allowed for flexible work arrangements for already-settled migrants and did not 
legally alter the fact that these migrants had temporary or long-term stay permits in Italy. 
In either case, the migrants’ stay status was independent of their employers. In Italy, the tasks, remuneration 
and other benefits were clearly regulated by the National Agreement, while in Poland several of the migrants 
were working informally.111 Given the private nature of domestic work, there is actually a high risk that even 
where formal contracts exist, they do not correspond to real working conditions and wages, as the employers 
have the upper hand and can threaten the employees with discontinuing the work and making them lose their 
migration status.112 
These examples, among others, support the claim for a stronger stance in favour of overarching guidelines at 
the regional and global levels to facilitate fair and efficient recruitment of international migrant workers while 
safeguarding conditions for decent work. Indeed, this auspice is included in the draft of the Global Compact 
for Migration, where United Nations members recall the necessity of implementing existing international 
instruments for the protection of human rights of migrants, including domestic migrant workers, scaling-up 
successful labour mobility schemes, and further developing common specific and shared norms for the ethical 
recruitment and protection of migrant rights at the regional and national levels. For example, regarding migrant 
domestic workers, the United Nations could push for the ratification of the relevant ILO Convention concerning 
decent work for domestic workers (Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189)) and the related Domestic 
Workers Recommendation, 2011 (No. 201), also adopted in June 2011, or for using the main elements of this 
Convention as a blueprint.
4.2. Key findings on bilateral mobility schemes 
Bilateral mobility agreements vary in their main features according to the different contexts of the countries 
involved. However, we can identify several elements that are regulated by bilateral mobility schemes and 
which enhance the likelihood that these schemes manage migration efficiently, encouraging regular migration 
and providing channels for prospective migrants. Overall, existing bilateral mobility schemes offer different 
combinations of a wide array of services for both prospective migrants and employers:
(a) Pre-departure orientation and training activities, often part of these schemes, try to offer workers some 
general information about the culture of the destination country, the working conditions, and the rules 
regulating contracts and pay. 
(b) Financial training113 on budgeting or on how to send remittances in a secure and fruitful way is sometimes 
included in pre-departure activities. 
109 Marchetti, 2013.
110 Ibid.
111 Iglicka and Gmaj, 2013.
112 Spencer et al., 2009:2; Shutes, 2012.
113 For example, see www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=144 (accessed 4 October 2018).
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(c) On-the-job training for newly arrived migrants is sometimes provided, while others try to reach a higher 
gender balance in the recruited workers.114 
Existing literature also highlights some important factors and topics that need to be addressed explicitly to 
prevent distortions in the application of the schemes which may also lead to migrants’ exploitation:
 ■ The degree of autonomy/dependence of workers from employers; 
 ■ The possibility of renewal of permits; 
 ■ The availability of integration services (above all, language training) for seasonal workers as well; and, 
 ■ The availability of trade unions and NGOs for providing guidance and support in case of disputes.115 
Moreover, as pointed out by Panizzon, Hazan and Plaza, main countries of destination are increasingly working 
with diaspora groups and associations in parallel with the adoption of bilateral mobility schemes, to support 
their own foreign policy objectives – and especially selective migrant recruitment – while promoting co-
development initiatives in the origin countries.116 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the European Union are among the cases scrutinized, where State–diaspora partnerships 
are used jointly with bilateral migration agreements to reach an enhanced level of migration management (albeit 
with a great deal of variation in terms of financial and diplomatic engagement) as well as on selection criteria for 
partners and mechanisms through which the partnership grows. 
Bilateral mobility and migration partnerships may include a broad range of objectives and actions. The flexibility 
of the instrument, and its longevity and transformation over time, reflect the mutual interest of origin and 
destination countries in addressing a wide range of aspects related to migration management: labour shortage/
excess, return and readmission, development and co-development, portability of skills, portability of welfare, 
and so on. While these agreements typically reflect the balance of power among the participating parties, 
what drives all stakeholders involved in finding compromise solutions is the cost of a “no-agreement” situation. 
Indeed, bilateral mobility schemes offer the advantage of institutionalizing long-term cooperation, include aspects 
of reciprocity while being flexible/adaptable enough to respond to changes on either ends of the migration 
corridor, and can play a role in preventing irregular flows as they offer regular channels to prospective migrants. 
4.3. Thinking forward: Temporary Migration Partnerships
Bilateral mobility schemes as reviewed here usually involve temporary or circular migration (whether seasonal 
or not) and tend to be sector-specific. One of their possible drawbacks, though, is that while designed to cater 
to temporary labour market needs, they often become permanent temporary arrangements. This has several 
negative side effects, as they may drive down and keep down wages, creating unsustainable competition for local 
workers. The fact that the concerned workers are considered as temporary may lead to them be treated also 
as “disposable”, leading to a deterioration of living and working conditions (accommodation may be in barracks, 
next to the workplace/work field, access to health services may be non-existent, social security and pension 
contributions may be avoided). 
At the same time, the availability of such temporary recruitment schemes may discourage employers from 
considering alternative solutions, such as the mechanization of harvesting in agriculture, or the improvement 
114 Ball et al., 2015.
115 Triandafyllidou, 2017.
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of living and working conditions so as to attract both settled migrants and natives to jobs that are structurally 
necessary, or indeed to create long-term immigration schemes for workers that fill long-term needs (e.g. care 
workers, whose services could be professionalized and integrated into social protection schemes).
These side effects of bilateral mobility regimes could be overcome if such regimes are based on multilateral 
partnerships that bring together not only the country of origin and that of destination, but also employer 
associations, trade unions and other civil society stakeholders, so that their impact on labour market dynamics 
is closely monitored and adjustments to the programme are made where necessary. An important feature 
of such partnerships could be to incentivize employers to treat these programmes as truly temporary and 
not lose sight of the fact that they cannot be permanent solutions. One incentive here could be to use the 
indirect costs of employment (notably payments for insurance, health care and pensions) in ways that directly 
benefit the employers and the workers.117 Thus, half of such costs received by the State as payroll taxes could 
be reinvested in employer associations to finance innovation, while the other half could be invested through 
diaspora organizations to the cities/regions of origin of the migrants to finance education and employment 
projects. This would help avoid dependency on migration remittances for regions of origin while also avoiding 
employer dependency on cheap and “disposable” migrant labour.118
In short, such programmes should be tailored to the needs and features of specific regions (of origin and 
destination) and specific sectors. They should not be considered a panacea but their overall impact on labour 
market dynamics and the economy, as well as on native and migrant workers, should be monitored and 
periodically assessed.
4.4. Thinking forward: Skills and Mobility Partnerships
Thinking forward on how to avoid brain drain and meeting the needs of both origin and destination countries for 
skilled personnel in specific labour market sectors, there has been increasing interest recently in the possibility 
of developing Global Skills Partnerships.119 The idea is that countries of destination that are in need of trained 
personnel in specific skill sectors (e.g. health-care and paramedical professions) would organize training at 
countries of origin, and would contribute both financially and in relation to curricula, with the view of then 
employing these trained migrants, filling their labour shortages in those occupations. Typically, the professional 
sector where different types of training partnerships have been tested so far is that of health professions, and 
more specifically nurses120, while the shipping industry is also a useful example.121 
The Global Skill Partnerships’ approach is based not only on the idea that supply and demand of skilled work 
would be facilitated and problems of skills and qualifications recognition would be avoided, but that such 
partnerships would also build capacity at origin countries. Skill partnerships’ “schools” would develop a “home” 
and an “away” track, and students would be asked to choose upon entry. The “away” track tuition would be 
covered by student loans to be repaid by students upon employment at destination and their higher earnings 
there. This repayment would also involve some financing of the “home” track so as to partly cover tuition 
fees for the “home” track and thus subsidize education and training of skilled workers that would stay in the 
home country and cater to the home country’s needs. The partnerships would involve a detailed schedule of 
the financing mechanisms and the curriculum with both public and private sector (employers) involvement. 
117 Martin, 2017.
118 Ibid.
119 Clemens, 2015, 2017a.
120 Clemens, 2015.
121 Martin, 2018.
4. Bilateral Mobility Schemes
22
They would also be complete with commensurate visa schemes so that the trained workers can move to the 
destination country upon completion of their course and take up jobs in the relevant sectors. Such visas would 
naturally include the necessary safeguards, avoiding tying the worker to a particular employee and guaranteeing 
agreed working and living conditions.
While the Global Skill Partnerships idea appears as a likely triple win situation, relevant schemes experimented 
with so far – between, for example, Germany and Tunisia, Canada and Jamaica, Mexico and the United States – 
have failed because they were not sufficiently well planned.122 Challenges included: (a) training facilities at origin 
countries for apprenticeships were not technically available; (b) the costs of tuition and subsistence were too 
high; (c) the visas were not forthcoming at the end of the training; and (d) the certification was not possible at 
the end for a combination of reasons. Successful schemes were characterized by heavy private sector (employer) 
involvement and joint training (both at origin and destination). However, these schemes have so far been pilots 
of train-and-migrate projects rather than of skills partnerships. The Australia–Pacific Islands programme for 
technical training was successful in the “home” track but the “away” track was abandoned because graduates 
had no professional experience in Australia and hence could not fit with the existing skilled temporary or 
settler visas. 
An area where joint training programmes at countries of origin seem to work well is the seafaring sector. In 
this sector, employers, recruitment agencies and countries of origin are heavily involved in the organization of 
the training.123 Recruitment agencies play a crucial role there in providing the link between the colleges and the 
shipping companies, thus securing jobs to their graduates. However, here too there is no “home” track that 
would help build capacity at the origin countries while, at the same time, the seafaring sector is peculiar in that 
migrant workers are employed on ships rather than at destinations.124
However, the idea of joint skills development partnership appears too good in principle to be abandoned, as it 
could respond to the migrants’ quest for a regular pathway to going abroad, to employers’ demand for skilled 
labour in specific sectors, and to providing for training and building capacity at origin countries, especially in 
much-needed sectors such as health care. We would like thus to propose that skills partnerships should be 
developed as integral parts of bilateral mobility schemes. 
These should be private–public sector partnerships involving employers and States at destination, and technical 
colleges and State authorities at countries of origin. There should be joint design of the curriculum, and 
apprenticeship for the “away” track should take place at destination. The existence of both a “home” and an 
“away” track should be made mandatory for any Skills and Mobility Partnership to develop. Public funding could 
be provided by countries of destination for the “home” track, employers should heavily subsidize the “away” 
track training, and clear visa schemes should be developed. Students should be asked to finance themselves for 
the apprenticeship period at destination through loans provided by credit institutions at destination countries, 
guaranteed by the employers. The employers would then be able to withhold a small percentage of the salary 
of the worker and pay back the loans safely. In other words, such Skills and Mobility Partnerships would have 
a strong development component.
122 Clemens, 2015.
123 Martin, 2018.
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5. SPONSORSHIP SCHEMES 
One of the lessons from the brief overview of bilateral mobility programmes provided above is that labour 
market dynamics125 remain a strong pull factor regardless of migration control policies in the absence of viable 
regular migration alternatives. Following objective number 5 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration, all United Nations Member States should enhance the availability and flexibility of pathways 
for regular migration. In particular, they should develop labour mobility agreements with sector-specific standards 
and effective skills-matching programmes as regular pathways for employment of migrants (ibid.:para. 20(d)). 
The Global Compact might constitute a relevant occasion to improve the governance on migration, addressing 
the challenges related to migration mobility worldwide.126 While regional and bilateral mobility regimes can offer 
a wider framework that regulates migration between two or more countries, taking into account the variable 
geometry dynamics of different regions and labour market sectors, and lowering the transaction cost, there is 
often a need to respond to migration pressures in a more ad hoc, focused way. A smart and flexible mechanism 
that can develop in different directions to respond to both migration and asylum seeking pressures is that of 
sponsorship.
This section focuses on the special schemes for sponsoring labour migrants, mainly targeting highly skilled 
migration, and the challenges of skills recognition and avoidance of “brain drain”. We briefly review relevant 
schemes in three global areas, notably North America (with a focus on Canada), the Asia–Pacific region (with a 
focus on Australia), and Europe (with regard to the EU). 
Further below, we review existing sponsorship schemes specifically addressed to asylum seekers or recognized 
refugees. As shown by the examples provided, countries with strong proactive migration policies favouring 
highly skilled migrants seem more likely to offer public and private sponsorship schemes to refugees. We also 
now consider the collective “sponsorship” system through humanitarian corridors that allow for a number of 
people based in a transit country to seek protection elsewhere, enabling a safe and regular passage. 
5.1. Employer-driven sponsorship schemes 
This section focuses mostly on highly skilled migration that is employer-sponsored. There are two basic strategies 
for regulating high-skill migration: through a point-based system, in order to assess the human capital of the 
migrant in advance, or by allowing recruitment to be driven by demand, notably by employers. Most OECD 
countries, including Japan and several EU countries, have primarily demand-driven immigration policies: high-skill 
migrants must be invited with a secure job offer by a local employer. By contrast, some other OECD countries – 
such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Denmark and the United Kingdom – adopt a points-based system to 
make entry conditional to the points accumulated on the basis of the migrant’s skills and qualifications.
The expression of interest system is the most recent innovation in the management of highly skilled migration. 
Introduced in New Zealand in 2004, this model has been adopted in different forms by Australia in 2012 and 
125 The examples offered above in the sectors of agriculture and domestic and care work highlight such dynamics.
126 EPRS, 2017.
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Canada in 2015 as “Express Entry”. The scheme is based on a first selection of suitably qualified potential 
migrants, followed by an employer’s invitation/expression of interest or by a selection by authorities on the 
basis of qualifications.
As a first step, candidates need to compile an electronic expression of interest in permanent immigration and 
are pre-screened based on specific eligibility criteria such as language skills and educational qualifications, as 
well as on the specific entry conditions of at least one of the federal programmes. Candidates entered in the 
selection pool may then be invited to apply for permanent immigration. The authorities begin selecting from the 
highest-ranking candidates.127 Canada’s Federal Skilled Worker Program is linked to the Express Entry system, 
which was reopened in 2013, and concerns all provinces. There is, however, an additional programme entitled 
the Provincial Nominee Program that aims at satisfying the priority needs of specific provinces. Thus, provinces 
and territories in Canada can nominate immigrants through the Provincial Nominee Program to attract them to 
specific territories in need of foreign workers for economic or demographic purposes, and to favour migrants’ 
integration within the country.128 
Similarly, Australia has different programmes for sponsoring highly skilled migrants: each type of visa scheme is 
designed for a different purpose. The permanent Employer Sponsored Programme and the Regional Sponsored 
Migration Scheme are based on an expression of interest approach: both are meant for applicants sponsored 
by an employer through specific labour agreements or regional migration agreement; the Temporary Residence 
Transition stream, on the other hand, concerns visa holders who have worked for at least two years for their 
employer, who may want to offer them a permanent position in that same occupation,129 and can therefore 
sponsor them to transition from the temporary to the permanent scheme. Relevant research has shown that 
points-based systems have considerable side effects, as once in the country highly skilled migrants are likely to 
face obstacles in having their education and experience recognized and in finding work in their own area of 
expertise.130 Visa pathways also matter, and the possibility of changing employer is important.131 In short, while 
the combination of employer-driven and qualifications-driven schemes perhaps offer the best combination of 
selective policies, they are not free of loopholes, and need to be constantly monitored and updated.
Despite the fact that highly skilled migration is seen as the desired type of migration that can boost Europe’s 
competitiveness, innovation and productivity,132 the EU-level regime for managing highly skilled migration and 
attracting global talent is still underdeveloped compared with Australia or Canada. Unsurprisingly, improving 
the management of economic migration and the labour market integration of migrants are among key priorities 
set by the European Commission for 2014–2019 to support the overarching goal of boosting growth and 
competitiveness across the EU (European Commission, 2015). The Blue Card Directive (Council Directive 
2009/50/EC) is the first attempt to develop a framework for attracting highly qualified third-country nationals 
and facilitating their admission and mobility across the EU.133 The European Blue Card allows employers, with 
recognized sponsor status, to sponsor migrant workers who meet educational and professional experience 
requirements when applying. 
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Despite its lofty ambitions, the final version of the Blue Card Directive allows for too much flexibility by 
member States in transposing the scheme into national legislation. Thus, most member States have opted for 
making the Blue Card scheme less attractive than their own national high-skill migration programmes, rendering 
it effect nearly void.134
Box 7: A temporary stay permit to search for employment – A short-lived experiment
The Government of Italy’s sponsorship programme aimed at regularizing and institutionalizing the work of migrant 
networks is worth noting. In 1998, the Turco-Napolitano law introduced a job-search entry channel.135 Italian citizens, 
legally resident foreigners, regions, local administrations, unions and voluntary organizations could sponsor the legal 
entry of migrants (up to two for families, six for organizations), who had 12 months to search for employment. 
The sponsor had to guarantee accommodation, health insurance, a return ticket and a small deposit in the bank. 
Once the migrant found employment, he or she could convert the sponsorship permit to a temporary residence 
permit for employment purposes. This scheme, which was unfortunately short-lived, as it was scrapped by the 
conservative Government that came to power in 2001, was particularly promising, as it legalized a process that was 
known to happen informally, whereby settled migrants would bring in friends or relatives as tourists and visitors, and 
introduce them to interested employers. The new arrivals would then start working informally waiting for the next 
regularization programme to legalize their stay and work status. Unfortunately, the measure was revoked without 
any assessment of its effectiveness.136
135 136
While recognizing the positive role that employer sponsorship schemes can have in creating channels for legal 
migration for both high- and low-skilled migrants, this does not make them waterproof from abuse. This has 
been the case of the kafala system, the employer sponsorship scheme widely practiced in the Middle East, 
notably in the Gulf Cooperation Countries,137 Jordan and Lebanon. Under this regime, the prospective migrant 
worker must be sponsored by a kafeel (employer) and remains linked to this same kafeel throughout their stay. 
The kafeel’s name is typically written inside the migrant worker’s entry visa, as well as in the residence and work 
permits. In this system, the employer acquires an excessive degree of power over the migrant worker, and this 
has frequently led to severe abuses, particularly in the absence of effective legal protection and monitoring 
mechanisms.
Considering the above examples, the matching of the supply and demand between employers and migrant 
workers emerges as an important factor in how sponsorship schemes work. The recruitment and sponsorship 
systems in Australia and Canada are proactive and use a double point of entry: migrants are selected according 
to their skills and qualifications or are given a level of “points”. Then, employers can select from this filtered 
pool of interested applicants and find the worker who best fits their needs. In Europe, the Blue Card scheme 
has aimed at merging the two steps, assuming that the employer and the prospective employee have already 
“found” each other and apply together (or rather the third-country national applies but indicates that they 
already have a job offer from a specific employer) for entry. Combining the two steps into one is probably more 
difficult to accomplish, as the State does not facilitate the matching of the employer and the employee. 
A promising type of sponsorship was the short-lived Italian system that allowed for citizens/residents and 
organizations to sponsor migrants who were in search of employment in the destination country, and which 
included several guarantees that the prospective migrants, if unable to find a job and sustain herself/himself, 
would leave the country. In this case, it was not the employer who sponsored the migrant but rather an 
intermediary – an individual or an organization. The system was too short-lived and has not been adequately 
134 Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan, 2014.
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analysed, but can provide for further reflection, as it diverges from the usual pattern of irregular chain migration. 
This individual or collective (organization-driven) sponsorship scheme for prospective migrant workers actually 
resembles some of the available schemes that allow for sponsoring refugees. 
5.2. Sponsorship schemes for refugees
According to UNHCR, 65.6 million people worldwide have been forced from their homes, with nearly 1.2 million 
people in critical need of resettlement.138 In response to such severe needs for international protection and 
resettlement, some countries have put in place specific programmes, mainly addressed to private subjects, who 
want to sponsor refugees. In the Global Compact for Refugees (2018), other pathways for admission of persons 
with international protections to third countries are contemplated as complementary to resettlement and, 
among them, the private or community sponsorship programmes are explicitly mentioned (Global Compact 
for Refugees, 2018: para. 3.3).
Since its creation in 1978, the Canadian Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program (PSR) provided refugee 
protection to over 280,000 refugees.139 Private sponsors are groups of Canadian citizens permanent residents, 
or Canadian organizations, often representing faith-based communities or cultural groups. Private sponsors 
provide financial support and settlement assistance for the refugees they sponsor, usually for one year after 
arrival. The PSR program complements Canada’s government assisted refugee programme, where the federal 
government provides the financial and settlement support for resettled refugees. The equivalent of one year of 
social security is held in a trust account and paid to the sponsored refugees by the sponsors – also as housing, 
clothing, furniture, household goods and food – after which they are eligible for public income support.140 
Australia has recently been piloting a private sponsorship model, the Community Support Programme, for 
up to 1,000 refugees and humanitarian entrants.141 The Australian programme provides for private subjects 
(enterprises, families, organizations and individuals) to propose refugees and humanitarian entrants for 
resettlement in Australia. The Community Support Programme differs from the Canadian Private Sponsorship 
of Refugees Program because Australian sponsors are almost entirely extended family members, and in Australia 
the money raised by sponsors is paid to the Government for the costs of visas and other services, and to 
nominated organizations for administrative and resettlement support.142 
The Government of New Zealand has recently launched the Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship 
Category addressed to 25 refugees who were to arrive in the State by June 2018. Refugees who meet relevant 
criteria and are sponsored by an approved community organization are to be granted permanent residence 
in New Zealand under an additional admission to complement the annual quota and engage the community 
organizations in the refugee resettlement.143
Recent and earlier research has highlighted some critical points regarding private sponsorship schemes for 
refugees144:
138 UNHCR, 2018.
139 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017.
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(a) Private sector entities may have an additional interest in supporting humanitarian entrants for corporate 
responsibility reasons, which may interfere with the allocation of places to those in greater need.
(b) The risk of “cherry-picking” well-trained refugees in preference to others might compromise and privatize 
humanitarian law provisions.
(c) Access to resettlement programmes for refugees would depend on having skills or already having some 
networks, such as family members (who can push sponsors for the entrance of their relatives) in the 
country.
(d) National governments might reduce available quotas of their programmes under the expansion of private 
sponsorship programmes as their sphere of action and management.
Box 8: Preferential paths for skilled refugees?
Recent concerns about migration pressures and the fact that refugees may resort to migrant smugglers and unlawfully 
enter destination countries have led to considering special points (in points-based schemes) for people suffering 
insecurity and escaping violence.145
The idea of a skilled-refugee visa, aside from an already-planned refugee quota, was also launched by UNHCR with 
the aim of facilitating the recognition of refugee skills or offering business sponsorships for skilled refugees.146 
145 146
For further information on private sponsorship programmes, please see:
Australia – Community Support Programme:
www.humanservices.gov.au/organisations/about-us/budget/budget-2017-18/migrants-refugees-and-visitors/
community-support-programme-establishment
Canada – Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative:
www.refugeesponsorship.org/
New Zealand – Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship Category:
www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/visa-factsheet/community-sponsored-refugee-resident-
visa
5.3. Key findings and issues on sponsorship schemes
Sponsorship schemes can be addressed towards different categories of migrants. In particular, employer-driven 
sponsorship schemes might have a positive role in creating channels for high- and low-skilled migrants through:
(a) Efficiently matching the offer and the demand between employers and workers: the countries adopting the 
points-based system, such as Australia and Canada, seem to be particularly efficient in managing candidates 
with job vacancies;
(b) Reducing bureaucratic obstacles and enhancing rights having a common framework on formal qualification 
recognition, as in the intention of the European Blue Card Directive;
(c) Helping the employers to fulfil the lack of information of potential workers;
(d) Managing the resource-intensive process of screening and hiring foreign candidates.
However, the possible abuse of power left to employers needs to be controlled.
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Sponsorship schemes can also, however, target asylum seekers and refugees:
(a) The use of these channels for safe and legal passages are increasing in the countries that show proactive 
policies towards high-skilled migrants.
(b) There is a need for monitoring carefully that vulnerability remains a priority, while skills and kinship ties with 
people at destination come second.
(c) There should be one public entity in charge of monitoring how the schemes are implemented and their 
performance should be periodically assessed.
Sponsorship schemes, when properly monitored, can offer a smart and balanced approach in allowing employers 
to play an active role in looking for the right people for a job. Such schemes avoid the emergence of informal 
networks that would favour irregular entry and work, and create tangible opportunities, particularly for the 
highly skilled. As with all schemes, they require careful monitoring and, when addressing refugees, they should 
not come at the expense of those more vulnerable. Indeed, addressing migrants in vulnerable situations is the 
focus of the next section. 
5.4. Thinking forward: Human Development Visa Scheme
Thinking forward towards additional measures that can discourage prospective migrants from taking up irregular 
pathways and rather encourage them to try their luck through regular channels, we would like to recommend 
the proposal outlined by McAuliffe for a “Human Development Visa Scheme”.147
A Human Development Visa Scheme targets and responds to the agency of migrants and their hope for a better 
life for themselves and their children. The scheme would be implemented at the national level through a general 
transnational legal framework (that could be overseen by IOM). It would be open to citizens of participating 
States, would be managed through a centralized ballot-based selection of applicants, would have no skill level 
requirement (open to all levels) nor specific migration category requirement (e.g. worker, student, etc.). Migrants 
winning a Human Development Visa would be eligible to take their families with them to the destination country. 
The scheme would function with a set annual quota, which could be revised each year on the basis of factors 
related to conditions in both the country of origin and destination (labour market demand, or for instance 
hardship at the origin country). It would naturally involve some prior health and security checks. Those wining 
the visas would be eligible to work along with their spouses (if applicable). They would also be able to access 
education and other services at destination, while also having sufficient security of status that they would be able 
to maintain connections with the country of origin. The Human Development Visa would be of a sufficiently 
long duration (e.g. five years) so as to allow the migrant and her/his family to integrate at the destination and, 
where applicable, apply for a long-term permit.
The advantage of this visa is that it would be simple and straightforward, and would come across as a real and 
possible opportunity. It would give hope to people in search of security and discourage them from turning to 
migrant smugglers and irregular pathways. It would also allocate a limited number of places to a larger pool of 
applicants, but keep open the option for anyone who applies, each year. 
147 McAuliffe, 2017.
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6. THE PROTECTION OF MIGRANTS IN 
VULNERABLE SITUATIONS
6.1. Resettlement and humanitarian corridors
The international community provides safe and legal routes only to a certain number of refugees through 
resettlement schemes: annual quotas for visas to individuals entitled to specific protection under national refugee 
law are set, for example, by the United States, Canada, Australia and many EU Member States. Some of these 
are directed towards specific nationalities and humanitarian crises, as in the case of Syrians (see, for example, the 
Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme of the United Kingdom and the Australian and Canadian responses 
to the Syrian humanitarian crisis148), while others have broader coverage and more permanent mechanisms 
throughout the years (see, for example, Australia, Sweden; or Canada).149 
These traditional schemes are not sufficient to respond to the rising number of people recognized as needing 
international or humanitarian protection. Aside from those groups of migrants who fall under the internationally 
recognized definition of refugees whose rights are protected by the United Nations Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951, individual migrant characteristics and contextual factors related to 
irregular cross-border movements are associated with a high level of vulnerability to abuse, exploitation and 
violence.150 Regardless of one’s status, irregular migrant routes are increasingly reported as dangerous, costly 
and resulting in serious, long-term consequences for migrants’ mental and physical health. This has repeatedly 
been the situation of migrants with particular needs stuck at the Mexico–United States border,151 Venezuelans 
fleeing extreme instability and sometimes blocked at border areas with Colombia or other neighbouring 
countries,152 and migrants stranded in official and unofficial detention centres in Libya in conditions of abuse and 
de-humanization.153 
IOM has registered nearly 28,000 migrant deaths around the world from 2014 to the first half of 2018,154 which 
indicates the need to protect those who find themselves in danger while migrating irregularly. Although the 
concept of vulnerable migrants is still debated both in academia and among practitioners,155 it is being cited for 
humanitarian responses to protect (irregular) migrants in need in various regions of the world. The human rights 
and particular needs of vulnerable persons – including children, trafficked individuals, migrant workers, stateless 
148 United Kingdom Home Office, 2017; Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, n.d.
149 Government of Canada, 2018; Swedish Migration Agency, 2018.
150 Galos et al., 2017.
151 Dozens of migrants in caravan stuck at US-Mexico border. Available from www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43945522 (accessed 
4 October 2018).
152 IOM, 2018b.
153 OHCHR and UNSMIL, 2016.
154 Missing Migrants. Available from https://missingmigrants.iom.int/ (accessed 4 October 2018).
155 Peroni and Timmer, 2013; Galos et al., 2017.
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persons and persons with disabilities – have become increasingly salient when it comes to the international 
humanitarian response in many situations. Migrants’ vulnerability is not related to their inherent features as such, 
but rather to the conditions at origin countries, the experiences lived during the journey, and the context of 
arrival. The mix of situational and personal characteristics that affects migrant vulnerability should be assessed 
individually.
Box 9: A visa for vulnerable migrants: A policy proposal from IOM to Europe
In December 2017, the IOM Office in Brussels released some recommendations to the Bulgarian presidency of the 
EU Council (from January to June 2018). The document156 proposes, among other things, to envisage legal and safe 
avenues for vulnerable migrants with specific protection needs to enter the EU to seek available and applicable forms 
of protection. An “EU visa for vulnerable migrants” could allow vulnerable migrants not eligible for international 
protection (refugee status and subsidiary protection status according to the recast Qualification Directive 2011/95/
EU) to access legally and safely to EU countries, and to let them seek protection under already existing provisions 
(for example, with regard to victims of trafficking, victims of torture, unaccompanied children, etc.).
The proposal is hence focused on tackling irregular migrant journeys, reducing the risk to life of those moving irregularly 
and countering the smuggling services. According to IOM, a visa for vulnerable migrants could also strengthen the 
EU’s external border management and facilitate sustainable returns and readmissions of those migrants who are not 
or no longer in a condition of vulnerability.
156
Humanitarian voluntary return programmes have been increasingly implemented during the last few years 
(second half of the 2010s) – especially in the case of Libya157 – with the aim of safely returning migrants to their 
origin countries and to third countries in response to crisis contexts (see Box 10). Evacuations from Libya to 
Niger for further assessment and eventually resettlement of refugees started in November 2017,158 with some 
refugees being directly transferred from Tripoli to Italy.159 The idea is that migrants under highly precarious and 
violent circumstances (such as those in Libya) should be given a temporary regular migration status in a third 
country. Within the EU-sponsored Libya evacuation scheme, such a third country can be the last country of 
transit, notably Niger. 
Box 10: Migrants in countries in crisis
The 2011 Libya crisis led to multiple calls for action by States, United Nations representatives, international 
organizations and civil society to better address the protection of migrants in the context of conflicts or natural 
disasters. The Migrants in Countries in Crisis initiative was born of this momentum and built on earlier frameworks in 
order to better coordinate humanitarian activities and migration management services to protect and assist migrants 
in terms of emergency humanitarian response. The initiative emerged out of recognition that vulnerable migrant 
populations had previously been left out of existing frameworks, even though their needs and vulnerabilities can be 
extreme.
In addition to more systematic State-led resettlement programmes, some smaller-scale sponsorship programmes 
that can also tap into broader community networks have been advanced through the initiative of non-State 
actors, in particular NGOs and faith-based organizations.160
156 Available from www.iom.int/news/un-migration-agency-releases-recommendations-incoming-eu-council-presidency-bulgaria 
(accessed 5 October 2018).
157 Available from www.iom.int/news/voluntary-humanitarian-returns-libya-continue-reintegration-efforts-step (accessed 5 October 
2018).
158 Available from www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/2/5a8451f84/1000-refugees-evacuated-libya-unhcr.html (accessed 5 October 
2018).
159 Available from https://reliefweb.int/report/italy/humanitarian-corridors-vulnerable-refugees-italy-opening (accessed 5 October 
2018).
160 Collett, Clewett and Fratzke, 2016; Trotta, 2017; Squire, 2016; Treviranus and Casola, 2003; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011.
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Box 11: Humanitarian corridors sponsored by faith-based organizations
In Italy, the Federation of Evangelical Churches, the Waldesian Church and the Catholic Community of Sant’Egidio, in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in coordination with UNHCR, have 
implemented a humanitarian corridor scheme entitled “Mediterranean Hope”.161 
The agreement granted 1,000 visas to refugees “in particularly vulnerable conditions” to be transferred to Italy from 
Lebanon and Morocco from January 2016 to December 2017. 
Legally, the initiative is addressed to vulnerable people who meet one or more of those criteria and who could be 
entitled to an entry visa with limited territorial validity, according to article 25 of EC Regulation 810/2009, which 
gives a member State the possibility of issuing visas for humanitarian reasons of national interest or because of 
international obligations.162 The faith-based initiative also includes and seeks to include refugees who otherwise would 
be very unlikely to be able to access protection, such as non-registered asylum seekers in Lebanon, but also refugees 
from sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa in Morocco and Ethiopia.163 The costs are covered through the 
organizations’ own financial resources named “8xmille”, an amount of personal income taxes that Italian taxpayers 
can choose to devolve to the State for social purposes or for religious institutions. Some 1,000 more beneficiaries 
will reach Italy between 2018 and 2019.
In 2017, following the Italian examples, the Government of France opened humanitarian corridors in France for 
granting up to 500 people over a period of 18 months long-stay visas, enabling them to apply for asylum upon arrival.
161 162 163
Humanitarian corridors managed by faith-based, NGOs and third-sector organizations constitute a recent 
innovation in the field of resettlement, as they make use of existing legislation of destination countries and seek 
the cooperation of the national authorities (for example, to release travel documents), while funding the scheme 
and the upcoming integration phase through private funding.164 Not only do they have a testimony role to raise 
awareness among communities at destination while testing innovative activities and services, but they can also 
offer best practices for more quality services and replicability to be mainstreamed into regular resettlement 
programmes of national authorities.165
While large-scale regularizations are not politically palatable in most European and North American countries, 
tailored regularization mechanisms have been put in place to address specific circumstances and categories of 
irregular migrants (i.e. the vulnerable ones). As an example, around 400,000 Venezuelans have been regularized 
by host countries in the region, according to the most recent estimates,166 reducing the vulnerability and 
facilitating practical support of affected migrants in the region by international and national organizations.
A notable initiative comes from the United Arab Emirates and Dubai, who announced on 21 June 2018 that 
they will offer extendable one-year visas to people who have overstayed their previous visas if they come from 
countries affected by war or natural disasters. This amnesty programme167 was to run from 1 August until 
31 October 2018, and was aimed at giving temporary protection to those people in highly vulnerable situations 
given the conditions in their country of origin. 
Regularization mechanisms that grant some form of humanitarian residence permits to (irregular) exploited 
migrants, unaccompanied children and victims of trafficking can indeed be complementary to other measures, 
161 Collett, Clewett and Fratzke, 2016.
162 Mallardo, 2017; Trotta, 2017.
163 Trotta, 2017.
164 Squire, 2016.
165 Trotta, 2017.
166 IOM, 2018c.
167 “Citizens of war-torn countries living in the United Arab Emirates granted ‘one-year asylum’”. Available from www.thenational.ae/
uae/government/citizens-of-war-torn-countries-living-in-uae-granted-one-year-asylum-1.741535 (accessed 5 October 2018).
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and should be in principle always available to ensure a rights-based, rational and pragmatic alternative when 
returns are non-enforceable on humanitarian grounds (vulnerable migrants) or on administrative grounds (lack 
of bilateral cooperation). 
These types of responses to humanitarian crises involving migrants (including stranded migrants in transit 
countries) are relatively new compared with other longer-term resettlement and humanitarian needs/
stabilization programmes. They respond to the need for a variable geometry approach that takes into account 
the conditions and constraints in different regional contexts. Changing migration dynamics raise important 
questions around both prevention and adequate response of these instruments, which express a great deal of 
operational adaptability but are small in scale and would need more sustainable support to scale-up and add to 
the more traditional government-led resettlement schemes. 
6.2. Lessons learned: Regularizing migrants
Irregular migrants are likely to be excluded from the formal labour market and from accessing adequate health, 
education and housing services, and they are particularly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. The existence 
of large irregular migrant populations in many parts of the world poses a series of challenges in terms of access 
to fundamental rights, social integration, and non-discrimination of marginal populations. Indeed, the profile 
of those who remain in irregular situations is likely to reflect the selectivity of migration policy in terms of 
education, skill, and economic, cultural, social, or ethnic background and status, thus reinforcing pre-existing 
inequalities among different population groups to which differentiated access to services is granted. Moreover, 
migrants’ human rights can be jeopardized by hostile environments against “unwanted” individuals, or by States 
that disregard the presence of irregular migrants within their territory. Moreover, in Europe as well as in the 
United States, recent policy moves are more focused on (externalized) border control policy to prevent new 
irregular migratory movements and are not explicitly addressing the condition of those who become irregular 
within their boundaries (from failed asylum seekers in Europe to the children of irregular migrants in North 
America, for whom the DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) programme has been halted). In a 
cascade effect, this pushes their neighbouring countries to become more and more immigration rather than 
transit countries (Mexico, Morocco, Turkey, etc.), which in turn results in the adoption of new regularization 
measures on their side, as in the recent case of Morocco.168 
Whereas in the late 2000s the debate was divided between the fears of encouraging further irregular migration 
by pardoning those who break the rules and the recognition of the significant economic and integration 
benefits of regularizing irregular migrants, more recently the public debate in most European countries focuses 
predominantly on actions aimed at preventing further irregular entries by sea and by land rather than regularizing 
those already irregularly present. Indeed, further large-scale regularizations would not be politically palatable 
at this particular moment. From the irregular migrant’s perspective, as well as for children born or raised in 
irregularity, accessing regularization schemes is an opportunity to change their lives, to access the formal labour 
market and available public services. Assessing the efficacy of such schemes, and understanding what happens to 
regularized migrants after a period of time spent in terms of social and economic inclusion, can only be achieved 
through longitudinal analyses of those who have already undergone a regularization process.169 
The final draft of the Global Compact for Migration (2018) includes two specific actions (points h and i under 
objective 7), which promote the importance of “facilitat[ing] transitions from one status to another… so as 
168 AAVV, 2016.
169 Fasani, 2015; Monras, Vázquez-Grenno and Moreno, 2018.
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to prevent migrants from falling into an irregular status” and “facilitat[ing] access for migrants in an irregular 
status to an individual assessment that may lead to a regular status on a case by case basis and with clear and 
transparent criteria, especially in cases where children, youth and families are involved, as an option to reduce 
vulnerabilities, as well as for States to ascertain better knowledge of the resident population”.
The Global Compact for Migration (2018) specifically suggests:
h) Develop accessible and expedient procedures that facilitate transitions from one status to another and 
inform migrants of their rights and obligations, so as to prevent migrants from falling into an irregular 
status in the country of destination, to reduce precariousness of status and related vulnerabilities, as well 
as to enable individual status assessments for migrants, including for those who have fallen out of regular 
status, without fear of arbitrary expulsion.
i) Build on existing practices to facilitate access for migrants in an irregular status to an individual assessment 
that may lead to regular status, on a case by case basis and with clear and transparent criteria, especially 
in cases where children, youth and families are involved, as an option to reduce vulnerabilities, as well as 
for States to ascertain better knowledge of the resident population.
Nevertheless, other elements in the document pose some doubts on the overall coherence of objectives and 
the actual possibility of implementing regularization schemes on increasing numbers of migrants in Europe, 
North America and many other regions. 
The Global Compact for Migration also stresses the importance of distinguishing migrants from refugees, 
mirroring the mandate of distinct United Nations organizations. Nevertheless, when it comes to the wide range 
of regularization alternatives and possible residence permits within the same legal context accessible to different 
categories of migrants, from residence for work purposes to family reunification, from asylum to other forms of 
humanitarian residencies (permits for victims of trafficking, unaccompanied children, exploited labour migrants, 
etc.), the binary distinction might be difficult to implement in practice. 
Regularization programmes and mechanisms should be regarded as complementary options to be activated 
depending on the circumstances and in combination with other migration policies to increase country-level 
coherence and international coordination. Permanent regularization mechanisms in principle should always be 
available as a rational and pragmatic alternative when returns are non-enforceable on humanitarian grounds 
(migrants seeking protection and other vulnerable migrant categories) or on political grounds (lack of bilateral 
cooperation). Permanent mechanisms available to assess individuals on a case-by-case basis would lower the 
probability of increasing irregular populations to then be regularized through mass amnesty programmes. 
Indeed, offering accessible ways out from irregularity or transitory status could avoid the emergence of so-
called “illegality traps”, leaving mass regularization programmes to actual emergencies. Rather than criminalizing 
irregularity, any policy response directed towards those who are already in an irregular condition should 
generally be based on pragmatic attempts to find proper solutions in economic terms, while ensuring the basic 
human rights of all those involved. 
6.3. Key findings on protecting migrants in vulnerable situations
Vulnerability is a relatively new and debated policy concept seeking to respond to protection needs that do not 
qualify as straightforward asylum, but which still require a special response when migrants get trapped in violent 
situations, whether in transit or at destination, and need to be evacuated. It is emphasized that vulnerability 
has little to do with the inherent characteristics of the migrant (age, gender, socioeconomic situation before 
leaving) and more to do with the circumstances in which the migrant finds herself/himself which make her/him 
particularly vulnerable. 
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Our research has highlighted the following main points:
(a) Special schemes addressing migrants in vulnerable conditions have proliferated in recent years.
(b) Several of those are small in numbers, and implemented by civil society or religious organizations in 
cooperation with governments targeting specific populations.
(c) There is also an emerging set of State policy initiatives providing temporary permits to vulnerable migrants 
who are unable to return to their own countries.
(d) Large-scale schemes of evacuation of migrants in particularly vulnerable conditions are being tried currently 
(in 2018) in Libya with the support of the EU, but their efficiency is yet to be demonstrated.
The bolder ideas of special visas for vulnerable migrants have not yet been endorsed by States, but there is an 
increasing recognition that we need to provide viable channels for vulnerable migrants to access safety.
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This report seeks to fill a gap in comparative policy research addressing regular and irregular migration seeking 
to highlight good practices that can inspire policy design and implementation by different countries in view of 
managing more effectively their migration realities. One of the main concerns identified in this report but also 
more generally is to identify populations that are at risk because of trying their luck through irregular channels, 
using the services of migrant smuggling networks, abusing the terms of their visas, or overstaying when their 
asylum application is rejected or their stay permits have expired.170 In other words, attention needs to be paid 
to the nexus between potential irregular movements and regular pathways.
With this particular perspective as its springboard, the report has considered a number of policy tools and 
schemes. We have reviewed the ambitious character of enhanced regional mobility regimes. These have been 
shown to have great promise as they promote economic integration between countries in the same world 
region, are a corollary to international trade (they develop alongside trade and partly complement it)171 and 
annul migration control costs. However, they also require developed administration services that can manage 
such mobility which, while free, is still registered. So far, the European Union and to a lesser extent MERCOSUR 
stand out as advanced regional mobility regimes that have facilitated the movement of millions of workers while 
improving the protection of the rights of these workers and their families, and responding flexibly to labour 
market dynamics. Naturally, even in these cases, there have been downsides, such as public opinion concerns 
about being overwhelmed by newcomers or about welfare abuse172 and illegitimate competition to native 
workers173. In other world regions, such regimes have been less successful because of several implementation 
problems, including the very governance of mobility through appropriate travel documents (as in the case of 
Africa and ECOWAS) or by stark disparities between countries and widespread tolerance of migrant worker 
exploitation (as in ASEAN in South-East Asia).
Bilateral mobility schemes – while less ambitious than regional regimes and certainly more limited in scope – 
have been shown to work more effectively, particularly when concerning neighbouring countries or countries 
within the same geographical region. Examples abound, ranging from the EU–Morocco Mobility Partnership and 
the Spain–Morocco seasonal migration schemes for employment in agriculture, to New Zealand’s Recognised 
Seasonal Employer Scheme and a similar Australian scheme, both addressing Pacific States. Interesting insights 
were offered by schemes focusing on specific labour market sectors such as domestic work and arrangements 
of circular migration or job-sharing that can match the requirements of both migrant workers (to periodically 
return home) and of employers (to have affordable care). 
For these schemes to work effectively, however, State-level agreements need to be coupled with pre-departure 
information and training, and with monitoring and support mechanisms if conditions at destination are different 
170 See, for instance, Clemens, 2017b; McAuliffe, 2018.
171 See also Rapoport, 2018.
172 Portes, 2013; Preston, 2014.
173 Rolfe and Hudson-Sharp, 2016.
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from those formally agreed upon. This is not always easy, as migrants can find themselves isolated with little 
knowledge of their rights and dependent on their employers for survival. Good practices are identified in Italy’s 
flexible but detailed regulation of domestic work, which is a sector where migrant women are predominantly 
employed, while for instance the institutionalized circularity between Poland and its eastern neighbours (mostly 
Ukraine, and secondarily the Republic of Moldova and Georgia) offers the advantage of flexibility but suffers 
from migrant work irregularity, as most migrants are employed informally. 
Thinking forward, we have developed here two proposals: 
(a) Temporary Migration Partnerships: These are multilateral partnership schemes between a country of 
origin and a country of destination, also directly involving, however, employer associations, trade unions and 
other civil society stakeholders. They should last for a set number of years and would involve using payroll 
taxes for investment. At destination countries, these taxes should be invested in innovation and technology. 
At origin countries, such taxes should be used to fund education and employment at origin. Either way, the 
aim will be to reduce dependency on migration: remittance dependency at origin, and “disposable” migrant 
labour dependency at destination. 
(b) Skills and Mobility Partnerships: These are private–public sector partnerships involving employers and 
States at destination, and technical colleges and State authorities at countries of origin. The existence 
of both a “home” and an “away” track should be made mandatory. There should be joint design of the 
curriculum, and apprenticeship for the “away” track should take place at destination. Country of destination 
public funding could be provided for the “home” track, employers should heavily subsidize the “away” track 
training, and clear visa schemes should be developed as an integral part of the partnership. Students should 
be asked to finance themselves for the apprenticeship period at destination through loans provided by 
credit institutions at destination countries, guaranteed by the employers. 
Responding to some of the concerns arising in bilateral mobility schemes, as well as to pressures for regular 
migration opportunities, several employer-driven sponsorship schemes have developed in destination countries. 
These include schemes aimed at selecting among a pool of highly qualified prospective migrants such as the 
Australian or Canadian “express entry” type of schemes, where prospective migrants are filtered through a 
points-based system but can then be selected by an employer on the basis of their score or be invited through 
a provincial nominee programme. While these schemes appear to be optimal for skilled migrants, some further 
attention and improvement is needed for streamlining issues of skills and qualification recognition. Employer-
driven sponsorship schemes need not only address highly skilled migrants. Our report illustrates the potential 
of a sponsorship scheme introduced briefly in Italy that allowed Italian citizens (and legally residing foreigners) 
or NGOs to sponsor migrants who came to the country in search of employment.
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of private or community sponsorship schemes for refugees. 
Of those, the largest and oldest programme is Canada’s, which has provided support for approximately 280,000 
refugees over four decades (from 1978 to the present). Other such programmes that have recently been 
initiated include community programmes by New Zealand and Australia, which, however, remain very small in 
terms of the number of people covered, or the humanitarian corridors’ initiative implemented by faith-based 
organizations in Italy and France in the last couple of years. In all of these cases, the beneficiaries range from 
a few hundred to a few thousand, while important challenges arise as to the continuity and quality of support 
within such private sponsorship programmes, as well as with regard to their selectivity (privileging people with 
kinship or other networks, or skilled refugees). There is scope for further studying and expanding private or 
combined private and public sponsorship schemes for both migrants and refugees, as they can provide for new 
pathways towards integration, and can respond to pressing needs where State policies may be slower.
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In addition to the small-scale schemes, there have been important State-led, larger initiatives for addressing 
vulnerable migrants. These include transnational cooperation between, for instance, the European Union and 
important transit countries (for example, Niger and Mali) with a view to evacuate into safety stranded migrants 
from Libya, or State visas regularizing vulnerable migrants who cannot return to their countries (such as those 
recently announced by the United Arab Emirates).
Beyond sponsorship schemes, and with a view to responding to migrants’ strong sense of agency and hope to 
improve their lives, we have explored the possibility of a Human Development Visa Scheme. Such a scheme 
would be open to citizens of participating States, would be managed through a centralized ballot-based 
selection of applicants, would have no skill level requirement (open to all levels) nor specific migration category 
requirement (e.g. worker, student, etc.). Migrants winning a Human Development Visa would be eligible for 
taking their families with them to their destination countries. The scheme would function with a set annual 
quota, which could be revised each year. Those winning the visa would be eligible to work along with their 
spouses (if applicable). They would also be able to access education and other services at destination, while also 
having sufficient security of status that they would be able to maintain connections with the country of origin. 
The Human Development Visa would be of a sufficiently long duration (e.g. five years) to allow the migrant and 
her/his family to integrate at destination and, where applicable, apply for a long-term permit.
Overall, this report highlights the main features of an effective labour and other migration management policy 
that discourages irregular migration and encourages regular pathways. These include:
(a) A variable geometry approach: Different types of schemes for different types of migrants and for different 
sets of countries. Regional and bilateral regimes offer important insights here. 
(b) A smart approach: A focus on migration pressures and on populations at risk of turning to irregular 
migration when regular migration or asylum-seeking pathways are not available to them: We need to 
come up with focused policy tools that alleviate these pressures before they erupt into a crisis. A smarter 
understanding of contextual factors driving irregular migration is thus crucial.
(c) A balanced approach: One that responds to labour market and other considerations of destination countries, 
but is developed in cooperation with origin countries, and acknowledges the needs of migrants and their 
families.
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